Wuhan Authentication
Wuhan University publishes no public API and no API key programme, but it does operate a campus single-sign-on estate whose protocol surfaces are openly readable, and one of them -- the OpenID Connect discovery document at cas.whu.edu.cn -- is the only conforming, self-describing, machine-readable contract this institution serves to the anonymous public. Three protocols answer on institution-operated hosts: OpenID Connect and CAS on cas.whu.edu.cn/authserver, and SAML 2.0 on both cas.whu.edu.cn and idp.whu.edu.cn. All of them authenticate people into WHU's own applications; none of them fronts a public data or service API, and no dynamic client registration was attempted. The discovery document ADVERTISES a registration_endpoint, but this profile records that as a declaration, not as an invitation -- it was never called, and an unauthenticated caller should assume it is closed. What the OIDC document is NOT is evidence of WHU engineering an authorization server. It is the standard discovery shape emitted by the Wisedu CAS product, and the same document appears at hundreds of Chinese university authserver deployments. The DEPLOYMENT is the institution's; the contract shape is the product's. That distinction is the whole point of this pipeline and it is why no OpenAPI has been derived from these endpoints.
Wuhan University declares 0 security scheme(s) across its OpenAPI definitions.
Security Schemes
Source
Authentication Profile
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