The Bank Of London Authentication

generated: '2026-08-30'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://developer.bankoflondon.com/docs/overviews/authentication-message-signature-guide +
  https://developer.bankoflondon.com/docs/overviews/architecture-security-guide +
  https://developer.bankoflondon.com/docs/guides/getting-started-guide +
  openapi/the-bank-of-london-api-openapi.json (components.parameters.JwsSignature)
summary: >-
  The Bank of London API does not use bearer tokens or a plain API-key header. Every request carries
  a detached JSON Web Signature in the `x-jws-signature` header, produced with the private key of an
  API key pair created inside the Developer Studio. The signature binds the request target, method,
  content-type, a SHA-256 content digest, a single-use nonce and a creation timestamp, so a captured
  request cannot be replayed or altered. The published OpenAPI declares NO `components.securitySchemes`
  block at all — the scheme is carried only as a required header parameter (`JwsSignature`) applied to
  all 58 operations, which is why a spec-only reader would wrongly conclude this API is unauthenticated.
spec_declared:
  security_schemes: {}
  note: >-
    components.securitySchemes is an empty object in the published contract, and there is no top-level
    `security` array. This is a real gap in the contract, not in the product: the header parameter
    `x-jws-signature` ($ref components/parameters/JwsSignature) is marked required on every operation.
schemes:
- id: jws-message-signature
  type: http-message-signature
  location: header
  header: x-jws-signature
  algorithm: PS256
  algorithms_supported: [PS256]
  key_material: >-
    API Key + secret pair generated per App in the Developer Studio; the secret is shown once and
    cannot be retrieved again. Each key is bound permanently to exactly one environment (Live or
    Sandbox) at creation time.
  jose_header:
    alg: PS256 (only PS256 is supported)
    kid: Key ID indicating which key was used to secure the JWS
  jws_payload_claims:
  - name: request-target
    description: The request path per RFC 9110 HTTP Semantics, e.g. /v2/accounts
  - name: method
    description: HTTP verb; a mismatch against the actual request method is rejected
  - name: content-type
    description: Request content-type, e.g. application/json. Omitted when the request has no body.
  - name: content-digest
    description: SHA-256 hash of the request body with no whitespace or indentation before hashing
  - name: nonce
    description: >-
      Random unique string per signature to prevent replay. The same nonce must not be reused within
      a five-minute interval or the request is rejected.
  - name: created
    description: >-
      Creation time as an integer UNIX timestamp. Only messages signed within the last 5 minutes are
      accepted.
  verification_steps:
  - The request must be signed by the caller's private key.
  - The signed request must not be more than 5 minutes old.
  - The nonce must be unique — the same request cannot be sent twice.
  - The API Key must be active (not disabled or expired).
  - The message signature must be valid over content, date and authentication of the request.
oauth2:
  present_on_main_api: false
  note: >-
    No OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect flow exists on the Bank of London API v2. OAuth/OIDC applies only
    to the separate PSD2 / Open Banking UK v3.1 TPP interface operated by Salt Edge Priora, where
    TPPs perform dynamic client registration and PSU consent via OIDC. That interface is documented
    at https://priora.saltedge.com/docs/open_banking/tbol/v3.1 and no scope reference is published by
    either party, so no scopes/ artifact is emitted for this provider.
portal_authentication:
  mfa_required: true
  note: >-
    Mandatory two-factor authentication for all Developer Studio users, enforced strong password
    policy, role-based team access with audit logs covering API key creation/approval, invitations
    and role changes.
key_handling_guidance:
  source: https://developer.bankoflondon.com/docs/overviews/architecture-security-guide
  recommendations:
  - Store keys in an industry-recognised secrets vault (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, GCP, Azure).
  - Never place keys in plaintext, source code, logs or email.
  - Do not let end users contact the API directly; proxy through a gateway in your own secure data centre.
transport:
  tls_minimum: TLSv1.2
  note: All Bank of London services are accessible only over SSL with non-downgradable TLS 1.2 or higher.
docs:
- https://developer.bankoflondon.com/docs/overviews/authentication-message-signature-guide
- https://developer.bankoflondon.com/docs/overviews/architecture-security-guide