Hami Authentication

generated: '2026-09-12'
method: searched
source: >-
  grpc/hami-webui-*.proto, https://github.com/Project-HAMi/HAMi-WebUI/blob/main/charts/hami-webui/values.yaml,
  https://github.com/Project-HAMi/HAMi-WebUI/blob/main/server/internal/conf/conf.proto,
  https://project-hami.io/docs/installation/webui-installation,
  https://project-hami.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource,
  openapi/hami-website-discovery-openapi.json
docs: https://project-hami.io/docs/installation/webui-installation
note: >-
  Neither published HAMi API surface authenticates its callers, and that is a finding rather than a gap
  in our research. The HAMi WebUI contract declares no security scheme in any of its five .proto files
  and no auth interceptor is configured in the shipped server config; the documented access pattern is
  `kubectl port-forward service/my-hami-webui 3000:3000` with the docs stating plainly that "HAMi WebUI
  is exposed via localhost only". Access control is therefore delegated entirely to Kubernetes — RBAC
  on the port-forward, network policy, and whatever the operator puts in front of the optional Ingress.
  The `authorization` and `basicAuth` settings in the Helm values are OUTBOUND credentials the WebUI
  uses when scraping the operator's Prometheus, not inbound API authentication; conf.proto places both
  inside the `Prometheus` message, and the older flat `auth` field there is marked deprecated. The
  website discovery API is anonymous static content and says so: its own
  /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource returns an empty authorization_servers[] and scopes_supported[].
security_schemes: []
surfaces:
  - api: HAMi WebUI API
    authentication: none
    model: network-scoped
    enforcement: >-
      Kubernetes RBAC on `kubectl port-forward`, cluster network policy, and any authenticating proxy
      the operator places in front of the optional Ingress. Nothing in the shipped artifact
      authenticates a request that reaches the backend.
    transport: >-
      HTTP on 0.0.0.0:8000 and gRPC on 0.0.0.0:9000 inside the pod; the Helm service publishes port
      3000. TLS is not terminated by the application.
    evidence:
      - https://github.com/Project-HAMi/HAMi-WebUI/blob/main/server/config/config.yaml
      - https://project-hami.io/docs/installation/webui-installation
  - api: HAMi Website Discovery API
    authentication: none
    model: public
    enforcement: Public static documents served over TLS 1.3 by Netlify with HSTS max-age 31536000.
    evidence:
      - https://project-hami.io/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
      - openapi/hami-website-discovery-openapi.json
outbound_credentials:
  - name: Prometheus authorization
    where: Helm values `externalPrometheus`/`prometheus.authorization` -> conf.proto Prometheus.authorization
    type: HTTP Authorization header credential mounted from a Kubernetes Secret
    direction: outbound (WebUI -> operator's Prometheus)
  - name: Prometheus basic auth
    where: Helm values `prometheus.basicAuth` -> conf.proto Prometheus.basic_auth
    type: username/password mounted from a Kubernetes Secret, mutually exclusive with authorization
    direction: outbound (WebUI -> operator's Prometheus)
  - name: Prometheus TLS trust material
    where: conf.proto Prometheus.tls
    type: CA / client certificate mounted from a Kubernetes Secret
    direction: outbound (WebUI -> operator's Prometheus)
deprecated:
  - field: Prometheus.auth
    note: Marked `[deprecated = true]` in conf.proto — "use authorization or basic_auth with credentials mounted from files".
oauth: false
oidc: false
mtls: false
api_keys: false