Actively OAuth Scopes

generated: '2026-08-13'
method: probed
source: https://auth.actively.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs: null
docs_note: >-
  Actively publishes no scopes/permissions reference page. The scope list below
  is read verbatim from the authorization server's own scopes_supported array,
  which is the only published source.
description: >-
  OAuth scopes advertised by Actively's authorization server
  (https://auth.actively.ai), which fronts the hosted MCP server at
  https://api.actively.ai/mcp. The advertised set is the standard OpenID
  Connect quartet only — there are NO product-specific or resource-scoped
  permissions published. Whatever authorization Actively applies to
  per-account agent data is enforced server-side and is not expressed as
  OAuth scopes a client can request or a reviewer can inspect.
authorization_server: https://auth.actively.ai
resource: https://api.actively.ai/mcp
scope_count: 4
scopes:
- name: openid
  type: openid-connect
  description: >-
    Standard OIDC scope. Requests an ID token identifying the authenticated
    Actively user.
  source: scopes_supported
- name: profile
  type: openid-connect
  description: >-
    Standard OIDC scope. Grants access to basic profile claims via
    https://auth.actively.ai/oauth2/userinfo.
  source: scopes_supported
- name: email
  type: openid-connect
  description: >-
    Standard OIDC scope. Grants access to the user's email address claim.
  source: scopes_supported
- name: offline_access
  type: openid-connect
  description: >-
    Standard OIDC scope. Requests a refresh token so an agent can maintain a
    long-lived session against the MCP server without re-consent.
  source: scopes_supported
findings:
- >-
  NO RESOURCE SCOPES. The MCP resource https://api.actively.ai/mcp is
  protected, but no scope in the published set names it or any Actively data
  object (accounts, agents, memory, strategy, research). A client cannot
  request least-privilege access, and a security reviewer cannot tell from the
  token what an agent is permitted to read or write.
- >-
  This matters more than usual for this provider: the product connects
  autonomous per-account agents to CRM-derived revenue data in third-party AI
  clients (ChatGPT, Claude, Cowork). Scope granularity is the control surface
  a customer would use to bound that, and it is not published.
- >-
  Publishing resource-specific scopes (e.g. accounts:read, strategy:read,
  memory:write) in scopes_supported would be a low-cost, high-value addition
  and is the single clearest gap in an otherwise spec-clean OAuth
  implementation.
evidence:
- fetched: '2026-08-13'
  url: https://auth.actively.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  http_status: 200
  quote: '"scopes_supported": ["email", "offline_access", "openid", "profile"]'
- fetched: '2026-08-13'
  url: https://auth.actively.ai/.well-known/openid-configuration
  http_status: 200
  quote: '"scopes_supported": ["email", "offline_access", "openid", "profile"]'
- fetched: '2026-08-13'
  url: https://api.actively.ai/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  http_status: 200
  note: >-
    The api-host mirror omits scopes_supported entirely, so the auth host is
    the authoritative source.