Tandoor Vulnerability Disclosure

generated: '2026-08-27'
method: searched
source: https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/blob/develop/SECURITY.md
summary: >-
  Tandoor publishes a security policy in SECURITY.md and runs coordinated disclosure through GitHub
  Security Advisories on the TandoorRecipes/recipes repository. The programme is demonstrably live:
  10 CVE-bearing advisories were published between April and June 2026, each cross-referenced from the
  release notes of the version that fixed it. There is no /.well-known/security.txt, no bug bounty and
  no separate disclosure page — GitHub Security Advisories is the whole channel.
policy:
  url: https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/security/policy
  file: https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/blob/develop/SECURITY.md
  http_status: 200
  channel: GitHub Security Advisories
  intake_url: https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/security/advisories/new
  supported_versions: >-
    Latest version only. The policy states plainly that the software is considered beta/WIP and that
    there are no backports of security or any other fixes to older releases.
  safe_harbor_stated: false
  bug_bounty: false
  security_txt: false
  security_txt_probe:
    - url: https://tandoor.dev/.well-known/security.txt
      status: 404
    - url: https://docs.tandoor.dev/.well-known/security.txt
      status: 404
    - url: https://app.tandoor.dev/.well-known/security.txt
      status: 302
advisories:
  source: https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/security/advisories
  observed: 10
  window: 2026-04-03 .. 2026-06-30
  recent:
    - id: GHSA-wjf3-fq5w-7j7w
      severity: high
      published: '2026-06-30'
      summary: Private recipe authorization bypass via /api/step/ — read and modify another space's steps
      fixed_in: 2.6.12
    - id: GHSA-cqj3-64qw-4w52
      severity: high
      published: '2026-06-21'
      summary: Private recipe file and share-link authorization bypass in recipe utility API endpoints
      fixed_in: 2.6.10
    - id: GHSA-wq4h-2r8x-cv65
      severity: high
      published: '2026-06-21'
      summary: Blind SSRF via AI provider URL (api_base)
      fixed_in: 2.6.10
    - id: GHSA-f2gw-c2c7-59v7
      severity: high
      published: '2026-06-21'
      summary: ReDoS via user-controlled automation regex
      fixed_in: 2.6.10
    - id: GHSA-4x57-2q4q-xwpp
      severity: medium
      published: '2026-06-21'
      summary: ORM ORDER BY injection via FK traversal
      fixed_in: 2.6.10
    - id: GHSA-4vw7-c646-g23w
      severity: medium
      published: '2026-06-21'
      summary: Cross-user IDOR in /api/recipe-from-source/ bookmarklet import
      fixed_in: 2.6.10
    - id: GHSA-89pw-5qxc-7v86
      severity: medium
      published: '2026-04-16'
      summary: Stored XSS via Jinja2 template rendering in recipe instructions
      fixed_in: 2.6.9
    - id: GHSA-xvmf-cfrq-4j8f
      severity: high
      published: '2026-04-03'
      summary: BFLA — CustomIsShared permits DELETE/PUT on RecipeBook by read-only shared users
    - id: GHSA-8w8h-3pv2-3554
      severity: high
      published: '2026-04-03'
      summary: Input validation — amount/unit bypass serializer in food/{id}/shopping/
    - id: GHSA-9hhh-g2fc-r8x2
      severity: medium
      published: '2026-04-03'
      summary: Stored CSS injection via <style> tag in recipe instructions (API level)
  note: >-
    Nine of the ten advisories are API-surface findings — authorization bypass, IDOR, injection and
    SSRF on named /api/ endpoints. For an agent integrating against a self-hosted Tandoor this is the
    single most operationally relevant fact in the profile: run the latest release, because there are
    no backports.
static_analysis:
  codeql: https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/blob/develop/.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml
  note: CodeQL analysis runs in CI on the public repository.