Stensul Authentication

generated: '2026-08-29'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-content-api/,
  https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-user-api/,
  https://stensul.com/security-trust-center/
name: Stensul Authentication
derivable_from_spec: false
derivable_note: >-
  No OpenAPI or other machine-readable contract is published, so securitySchemes
  could not be derived. Everything below is read from Stensul's own public
  integration and security pages, which describe the auth model in prose without
  naming a token endpoint, grant type, scope, or base URL.
api_authentication:
- api: Stensul Content API
  scheme_type: oauth2
  flow: client_credentials
  flow_confidence: medium
  flow_evidence: >-
    Stensul describes it as "OAuth server-to-server authentication", which is
    the client-credentials grant in all but name. The exact grant string, token
    endpoint and token lifetime are not published.
  token_endpoint: null
  scopes_published: false
  additional_controls:
  - control: ip-allowlist
    detail: >-
      "IP address allowlists" — callers must originate from addresses registered
      with Stensul. This is a hard gate on programmatic access: an agent or CI
      job on an unregistered egress IP cannot call the API even with a valid
      token.
  source: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-content-api/
- api: Stensul User API
  scheme_type: oauth2
  flow: client_credentials
  flow_confidence: medium
  flow_evidence: >-
    Same "OAuth server-to-server authentication" language as the Content API.
  token_endpoint: null
  scopes_published: false
  additional_controls:
  - control: ip-allowlist
    detail: IP address allowlists, as with the Content API.
  - control: scim
    detail: >-
      Stensul states the User API "supports SCIM provisioning standards". The
      SCIM version (2.0 vs 1.1), the schema URNs, and the
      /ServiceProviderConfig endpoint are not published, and a probe of
      app.stensul.com/scim/v2/ServiceProviderConfig returns the application's
      SPA HTML shell rather than a SCIM document. Recorded as a vendor
      assertion, not a verified conformance.
  source: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-user-api/
end_user_authentication:
  note: >-
    Distinct from API auth. Stensul's application supports enterprise SSO via
    OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect and SAML 2.0, with published integration pages for
    Okta, Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), Ping Identity, Duo and Google Workspace.
    This is human sign-in to the product, not machine access to the APIs.
  protocols:
  - OAuth 2.0
  - OpenID Connect
  - SAML 2.0
  identity_providers:
  - name: Okta
    url: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-okta-integration/
  - name: Microsoft Entra ID / Azure AD
    url: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-azure-ad-integration/
  - name: Ping Identity
    url: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-ping-identity-integration/
  - name: Duo
    url: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-duo-integration/
  - name: Google Workspace
    url: https://stensul.com/integrations/google-workplace-integration/
  - name: SAML 2.0 (generic)
    url: https://stensul.com/integrations/stensul-saml-integration/
  source: https://stensul.com/security-trust-center/
gaps:
- No token endpoint URL published.
- No grant type named explicitly.
- No scope or permission reference published — scopes/ is therefore not written.
- No credential-provisioning self-service; keys are issued through the account team.