Pod Point · Authentication Profile
Pod Point Authentication
Authentication
Pod Point secures its APIs with http across 3 declared security schemes, as derived from its OpenAPI definitions.
EnergyUnited KingdomEV ChargingElectric VehiclesUtilitiesElectricityOCPICharge Point OperatorSmart ChargingGrid
Methods: http
Schemes: 3
OAuth flows:
API key in: header
Security Schemes
OCPI credentials token http
scheme: Token
· in: header ()
Pod Point Network API v3 bearer token http
scheme: bearer
· in: header ()
Pod Point API v5 auth http
scheme: bearer
· in: header ()
Source
Authentication Profile
generated: '2026-07-27'
method: searched
source: >-
Live anonymous probes of https://ocpi.podenergy.com on 2026-07-27, the OCPI 2.2.1-d2
specification, and the first-party @pod-point/api3-js and @pod-point/api5-js SDK
sources.
note: >-
Derived without an OpenAPI, because Pod publishes none. The auth model for the one
live API was established from the wire: every OCPI data module answers HTTP 401 with
the OCPI status_code 2000 envelope to an anonymous caller, and no OIDC or OAuth
authorization-server metadata exists on any Pod host. The legacy schemes are read
out of Pod's own published SDK source, not guessed.
summary:
types: [http]
api_key_in: [header]
oauth2_flows: []
openid_connect: false
mutual_tls: false
anonymous_surface: >-
OCPI version negotiation only (GET /ocpi/cpo/versions and GET /ocpi/cpo/2.2.1).
Nothing that carries data is reachable anonymously.
schemes:
- name: OCPI credentials token
api: pod-point:pod-point-ocpi-cpo-api
type: http
scheme: Token
in: header
parameter_name: Authorization
format: "Authorization: Token <base64-encoded credentials token>"
status: live
standard: OCPI 2.2.1, credentials module
registration: bilateral
self_service: false
docs: https://github.com/ocpi/ocpi
description: >-
OCPI 2.2.1 authenticates with an HTTP Authorization header carrying a Token A /
Token B / Token C obtained through the /credentials module handshake. By design
the handshake requires both parties to already hold each other's registration
details, so there is no anonymous or self-service path to a token. Pod publishes
no form, no email address, no partner API page and no criteria for obtaining one;
in practice it means a commercial roaming or eMSP relationship.
evidence:
- probe: GET https://ocpi.podenergy.com/ocpi/cpo/2.2.1/locations
status: 401
body: '{"status_code":2000,"status_message":"Unauthorized"}'
- probe: GET https://ocpi.podenergy.com/ocpi/cpo/2.2.1/tariffs
status: 401
- probe: GET https://ocpi.podenergy.com/ocpi/cpo/2.2.1/sessions
status: 401
- probe: GET https://ocpi.podenergy.com/ocpi/cpo/2.2.1/cdrs
status: 401
- probe: GET https://ocpi.podenergy.com/ocpi/cpo/2.2.1/credentials
status: 401
- probe: GET https://ocpi.podenergy.com/ocpi/cpo/versions
status: 200
note: Version negotiation is the only anonymous surface.
- name: Pod Point Network API v3 bearer token
type: http
scheme: bearer
in: header
parameter_name: Authorization
status: legacy
source: "@pod-point/api3-js v6.4.2 lib/services/AuthenticationService.js"
description: >-
The retired Pod Point Network API v3 exchanged user credentials for an access
token by POST to the `auth` endpoint, then sent `Authorization: <tokenType>
<accessToken>` on subsequent calls. The SDK Client was additionally constructed
with an accessKey and secretKey pair (Client(accessKey, secretKey, userAgent,
domain, prefix)) and bundles crypto-js, indicating a request-signing layer on top
of the bearer token.
base_url: https://api.pod-point.com/v3/
base_url_status: 403
note: Host decommissioned — returns S3 AccessDenied on every path. Recorded for lineage only.
- name: Pod Point API v5 auth
type: http
scheme: bearer
in: header
parameter_name: Authorization
status: legacy
source: "@pod-point/api5-js v1.2.0"
base_url: https://api.pod-point.com/v5/
base_url_status: 403
description: Same auth endpoint pattern as v3, against the /v5/ prefix. Host decommissioned.
not_present:
- scheme: oauth2
evidence: >-
No /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server on podenergy.com, ocpi.podenergy.com or
mobile-api.pod-point.com (all 404).
- scheme: openIdConnect
evidence: >-
No /.well-known/openid-configuration on any Pod host — podenergy.com 404,
ocpi.podenergy.com 404, mobile-api.pod-point.com 404, api.pod-point.com 403.
- scheme: apiKey self-service
evidence: >-
No developer portal, no signup, no key issuance page. developer., developers.,
docs. and data. do not resolve on either pod-point.com or podenergy.com.
- scheme: mutualTLS
evidence: Not advertised; OCPI 2.2.1 does not require it and no client-cert challenge was observed.