Johnnie O Authentication

generated: '2026-08-23'
method: probed
source: https://checkout.johnnie-o.com/.well-known/openid-configuration + live calls to the
  storefront GraphQL and UCP MCP endpoints
note: >-
  Three distinct auth postures coexist on Johnnie-O's surfaces, and they are not the same
  story. The identity provider is Shopify's per-merchant customer-accounts issuer for shop
  22750137; Johnnie-O did not author it, but it is advertised from Johnnie-O's own primary
  domain and issues tokens for Johnnie-O's customers.
schemes:
- id: storefront-graphql-anonymous
  surface: https://www.johnnie-o.com/api/2024-10/graphql.json
  type: none
  description: >-
    The Hydrogen app proxies the Shopify Storefront API and injects the storefront access
    token server-side. Anonymous POSTs succeed, including full __schema introspection. No
    Authorization header, API key or cookie is required by the caller.
  verified: probed
  evidence: 'POST {shop{name}} returned HTTP 200 with data, no credentials sent'
- id: ucp-mcp-agent-profile
  surface: https://checkout.johnnie-o.com/api/ucp/mcp
  type: agent-profile
  description: >-
    tools/list is anonymous. tools/call requires a UCP agent profile URI; without one every
    call returns JSON-RPC error -32001 with data.code invalid_profile_url. This is agent
    identity, not a bearer token or API key.
  verified: probed
  evidence: 'POST tools/call search_catalog returned -32001 "Unable to fetch agent profile:
    Missing profile uri"'
- id: customer-account-oidc
  surface: https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137
  type: openIdConnect
  description: >-
    OpenID Connect authorization-code flow with PKCE for Johnnie-O customer accounts.
    Advertised from checkout.johnnie-o.com/.well-known/openid-configuration and
    /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server (RFC 8414); the protected resource
    checkout.johnnie-o.com advertises it via RFC 9728 oauth-protected-resource.
  verified: probed
  issuer: https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137
  authorization_endpoint: https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137/oauth/authorize
  token_endpoint: https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137/oauth/token
  end_session_endpoint: https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137/logout
  jwks_uri: https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137/.well-known/jwks.json
  grant_types: [authorization_code, refresh_token, 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer']
  response_types: [code]
  code_challenge_methods: [S256]
  token_endpoint_auth_methods: [client_secret_basic, client_secret_post]
  id_token_signing_alg: [RS256]
  claims: [iss, sub, aud, exp, iat, nonce, sid, email, email_verified]
  subject_types: [public]
  scopes: [openid, email, 'customer-account-api:full', 'customer-account-mcp-api:full']
- id: storefront-customer-access-token
  surface: https://www.johnnie-o.com/api/2024-10/graphql.json
  type: apiKey
  in: query-argument
  name: customerAccessToken
  description: >-
    Customer-scoped Storefront reads (the customer query, address mutations, order history)
    take a customerAccessToken minted by the customerAccessTokenCreate mutation and passed as
    a field argument rather than a header. Anonymous callers can reach the mutation but not
    another customer's data.
  verified: derived
  evidence: "graphql/johnnie-o-storefront.graphql \u2014 QueryRoot.customer(customerAccessToken: String!)"
protected_resources:
- resource: https://checkout.johnnie-o.com
  authorization_servers: [https://shopify.com/authentication/22750137]
  bearer_methods_supported: [header]
  rfc: RFC 9728
mtls: false
api_keys_public: false