Immunai · Domain Security

Immunai Domain Security

Domain security

Domain security posture for Immunai, probed live across 3 host(s) and 1 registrable domain(s). 1 host(s) serve HTTPS (up to TLSv1.3); 0 advertise HSTS. Email/DNS controls: DNSSEC absent, SPF present, DMARC present (p=reject).

CompanyBiotechnologyImmunologyDrug DiscoveryArtificial IntelligenceMachine LearningSingle-Cell GenomicsMultiomicsClinical TrialsLife Sciences

Transport & Host Security

www.immunai.com
HTTPS: yes · TLS: TLSv1.3 · HSTS: no · cert expires: Sep 7 23:59:59 2026 GMT
api.immunai.com
HTTPS: no · HSTS: no
app.immunai.com
HTTPS: no · TLS: TLSv1.3 · HSTS: no · cert expires: Aug 26 23:59:59 2026 GMT

Domain (DNS/Email) Security

immunai.com
DNSSEC: no · SPF: yes · DMARC: yes (p=reject) · CAA: yes

Source

Domain Security

immunai-domain-security.yml Raw ↑
generated: '2026-08-04'
method: probed
source: live DNS/TLS/HTTP probes of apis.yml + OpenAPI hosts
hosts:
- host: www.immunai.com
  https: true
  tls_version: TLSv1.3
  cert_expires: Sep  7 23:59:59 2026 GMT
  hsts: null
  note: >-
    No Strict-Transport-Security response header. Served by Flywheel/5.1.0 (managed
    WordPress hosting).
- host: api.immunai.com
  https: false
  tls_version: null
  cert_expires: null
  hsts: null
  dns: 34.110.128.250
  http_status: null
  note: >-
    An A record exists but no Immunai service answers on it. TCP 443 connects to a
    Google Cloud front end, then the TLS handshake is reset before any certificate is
    presented (no peer certificate available). Port 80 does not answer either. This is
    a stale DNS record pointing at a Google Cloud address that no longer terminates for
    this hostname — not an Immunai API host.
- host: app.immunai.com
  https: false
  tls_version: TLSv1.3
  cert_expires: Aug 26 23:59:59 2026 GMT
  hsts: null
  dns: 34.144.219.193
  http_status: 403
  note: >-
    An A record exists but the address is not serving Immunai. TLS completes and
    presents a certificate for an unrelated third party — subject CN=*.asa.com.br,
    issued by ZeroSSL — so the hostname fails certificate validation for any client.
    Ignoring validation, the Google Cloud front end returns 403 Forbidden. This is a
    dangling DNS record aimed at a Google Cloud address now held by another tenant.
domains:
- domain: immunai.com
  dnssec: false
  caa:
  - 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
  - 0 iodef "mailto:security@immunai.com"
  - 0 issue "amazon.com"
  - 0 issue "awstrust.com"
  - 0 issuewild "digicert.com"
  - 0 issue "amazonaws.com"
  spf: true
  dmarc: true
  dmarc_policy: reject
findings:
- id: dangling-dns-records
  severity: informational
  hosts:
  - api.immunai.com
  - app.immunai.com
  summary: >-
    Two immunai.com subdomains publish A records into Google Cloud address space where
    no Immunai service is reachable. app.immunai.com presents a valid certificate for a
    wholly unrelated domain (*.asa.com.br), which is the signature of an address
    released back to the cloud provider and reallocated to another tenant while the DNS
    record was left in place. Recorded as observed fact; no exploitation was attempted
    and no takeover is asserted.
  observed: '2026-08-04'
- id: no-hsts
  severity: informational
  hosts:
  - www.immunai.com
  summary: >-
    The primary web host does not send Strict-Transport-Security, so it does not opt
    into HSTS preloading or protect against a first-request downgrade.
  observed: '2026-08-04'
- id: no-dnssec
  severity: informational
  hosts:
  - immunai.com
  summary: The immunai.com zone is not DNSSEC signed.
  observed: '2026-08-04'
strengths:
- CAA is published and pins issuance to Let's Encrypt, Amazon and DigiCert.
- CAA carries an iodef reporting address (security@immunai.com) for certificate misissuance.
- SPF is published and DMARC is enforced at policy p=reject.
- TLS 1.3 on the primary web host.
x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-08-04'
  method: dig for DNS/CAA/SPF/DMARC; openssl s_client for TLS; curl for HTTP status and headers
  note: >-
    api.immunai.com and app.immunai.com were recorded as unresolved by the prior
    enrichment round. They do resolve; this round probed them directly and recorded the
    real state. Neither serves an Immunai API.