Hyundai Authentication

generated: '2026-09-13'
method: searched
source: https://developers.hyundai.com/web/v1/hyundai/specification/account/account_token
docs:
  - https://developers.hyundai.com/web/v1/hyundai/specification/account/account_authorize
  - https://developers.hyundai.com/web/v1/hyundai/specification/account/account_token
  - https://developers.hyundai.com/web/v1/hyundai/guide_api
  - https://developers.hyundai.com/web/v1/hyundai/guide_console
provider: Hyundai
providerId: hyundai
api: Hyundai Developers Connected Car API
note: >-
  Hyundai Developers uses the Hyundai integrated account (현대자동차 통합계정) as its identity
  provider and states plainly in its own console guide that "현대자동차 통합계정은 OAuth 2.0 을
  지원하고 있습니다" — the integrated account supports OAuth 2.0. There is no published
  OpenAPI, so this profile is read from the provider's own API specification pages rather
  than derived from securitySchemes.
schemes:
  - id: oauth2_authorization_code
    type: oauth2
    flow: authorizationCode
    description: >-
      Three-legged authorization code flow against the Hyundai integrated account. The
      partner application redirects the vehicle owner to the authorize endpoint; the owner
      signs in, is shown their vehicle list, and consents per vehicle. Only vehicles the
      owner explicitly selects become readable. Shared vehicles are excluded from the list.
    authorization_url: https://prd.kr-ccapi.hyundai.com/api/v1/user/oauth2/authorize
    token_url: https://prd.kr-ccapi.hyundai.com/api/v1/user/oauth2/token
    authorize_parameters:
      - name: response_type
        required: true
        value: code
      - name: client_id
        required: true
        description: Client ID issued when the console project is registered
      - name: redirect_uri
        required: true
        description: >-
          Must match the Redirect URL registered in Console > Settings > Account API;
          a mismatch is rejected
      - name: state
        required: true
        description: >-
          CSRF state token generated by the application. The docs explicitly name
          cross-site request forgery as the threat and require Base64 or URL encoding
          when special characters are used.
    scopes_documented: false
    scopes_note: >-
      No scope parameter appears in the authorize request and no scope reference page
      exists. Authorization is granted per API at the project level (the console's API
      management page lists which APIs a project is approved for) and per vehicle at the
      consent step, not by OAuth scope string. scopes/ is therefore deliberately not
      written for this provider.
  - id: client_basic
    type: http
    scheme: basic
    description: >-
      The token endpoint authenticates the client with HTTP Basic over the
      base64(client_id:client_secret) pair issued at project registration. Content-Type
      must be application/x-www-form-urlencoded.
    applies_to:
      - POST /api/v1/user/oauth2/token
  - id: bearer_access_token
    type: http
    scheme: bearer
    bearer_format: opaque
    description: >-
      Every user, vehicle-profile, vehicle-status and warning-light operation is called
      with `Authorization: Bearer {access_token}`.
    applies_to:
      - GET /api/v1/user/profile
      - GET /api/v1/car/profile/carlist
      - GET /api/v1/car/profile/{carId}/contract
      - GET /api/v1/car/status/{carId}/*
      - GET /api/v1/car/status/warning/{carId}/*
      - GET /api/v1/car-service/terms/reject
  - id: admin_key_b2b
    type: apiKey
    in: header
    description: >-
      A separate server IP allow-list plus Admin Key is issued only to partners who have
      negotiated a B2B API contract. The console guide states these settings are shown
      "only when a separate API usage agreement has been arranged with us", so the B2B
      surface is not publicly documented.
    public: false
grant_types:
  - value: authorization_code
    purpose: issue a new token pair
  - value: refresh_token
    purpose: refresh the access token
  - value: delete
    purpose: >-
      revoke/delete the token — a non-standard grant_type value used in place of an
      RFC 7009 revocation endpoint
token:
  access_token:
    transport: Authorization Bearer header
    documented_lifetime: 24 hours
    example_expires_in: 7200
    discrepancy: >-
      The specification prose states access_token is valid for 24 hours after issue, while
      every published success example on the same page returns expires_in: 7200 (2 hours).
      Recorded as published; not reconciled by the provider. Clients should trust
      expires_in, not the prose.
  refresh_token:
    documented_lifetime: 1 year
    returned_on: authorization_code grant only
  token_type: Bearer
observed:
  - probe: GET https://prd.kr-ccapi.hyundai.com/api/v1/user/profile with no Authorization header
    date: '2026-09-13'
    status: 401
    body: '{"errId":"...","errCode":"4010","errMsg":"Require authentication"}'
    note: >-
      Confirms the documented error envelope and the 4010 account-API error code on a
      live unauthenticated request.
consent_model:
  description: >-
    Data access requires TWO consents layered on top of OAuth: the vehicle-access consent
    taken during login, and a separate Korean PIPA third-party-provision consent obtained
    through POST /api/v1/car-service/terms/agreement. Vehicle data calls fail with 4120
    ("Pre-operation is required") until the third-party consent has been completed.
  principles_published: https://developers.hyundai.com/web/v1/hyundai/intro
  principle_quote: The customer owns the data and shares if only when the customer agrees.