Formboost · Authentication Profile

Formboost Authentication

Authentication

Formboost declares 4 security scheme(s) across its OpenAPI definitions.

formsform-backendhtml-formsserverlessstatic-sitesreactnextjsvuewebhooksno-codedeveloper-toolsspam-filtering
Methods: Schemes: 4 OAuth flows: API key in:

Security Schemes

none
http
scheme: bearer
openIdConnect
oauth2

Source

Authentication Profile

formboost-authentication.yml Raw ↑
generated: '2026-09-02'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://formboost.app/docs/api-reference-and-config, https://formboost.app/security,
  https://formboost.app/llms.txt, plus live probes of https://formboost.app/f/{alias} 2026-09-02
summary: >-
  The public Formboost surface is UNAUTHENTICATED by design. The only endpoint an external client
  calls — POST https://formboost.app/f/{alias} — takes no key, no token and no header; the form
  alias in the URL is the entire credential. Everything that requires an identity (creating
  forms, reading submissions, configuring integrations) lives behind the dashboard, whose API is
  not publicly documented and whose host answers 403 to anonymous requests.
schemes:
  - id: none
    surface: POST https://formboost.app/f/{alias}
    type: none
    in: null
    description: >-
      No authentication. Anyone who knows a form's alias can post to it. This is the intended
      model for a form backend — the endpoint sits in public HTML where any visitor can read it.
    method: probed
    evidence: >-
      Live POST with no credentials on 2026-09-02 returned HTTP 202
      {"success":true,"message":"Submission accepted for processing"}.
  - id: dashboard-jwt
    surface: dashboard.formboost.app / service.formboost.app
    type: http
    scheme: bearer
    bearer_format: JWT
    description: >-
      "Dashboard access uses signed JWTs, and new accounts must verify their email address before
      the API accepts a request from them."
    public: false
    method: searched
    evidence: https://formboost.app/security
  - id: firebase-identity
    surface: dashboard.formboost.app
    type: openIdConnect
    provider: Google Firebase
    description: >-
      Sign-in is backed by Google Firebase; account records store "a bcrypt-hashed password or a
      Firebase identity."
    public: false
    method: searched
    evidence: https://formboost.app/security
  - id: google-oauth-drive-file
    surface: Google Sheets integration
    type: oauth2
    provider: Google
    scopes:
      - name: https://www.googleapis.com/auth/drive.file
        description: >-
          Per-file Drive access. Formboost states it requests ONLY drive.file, so it can reach
          the spreadsheets it created and nothing else in the user's Drive.
    description: >-
      The one native OAuth connection Formboost operates. It is an outbound authorization the
      customer grants to Formboost, not a way to authenticate INTO Formboost.
    method: searched
    evidence: https://formboost.app/llms.txt
outbound_auth:
  description: >-
    For webhook delivery the direction of trust reverses: the customer supplies custom headers
    (Authorization, X-API-Key, anything) that Formboost attaches to each delivery so the
    receiving endpoint can authenticate it.
  docs: https://formboost.app/docs/http-webhook
  inbound_verification: false
  inbound_verification_note: >-
    Formboost does not sign deliveries. There is no HMAC header, so a consumer cannot verify
    a payload came from Formboost. See asyncapi/formboost-webhooks.yml.
oauth_scopes_artifact: false
oauth_scopes_note: >-
  No scopes/ artifact is written. The only OAuth in play is the outbound Google drive.file grant
  recorded above; Formboost issues no tokens of its own and exposes no scope surface to consume.
abuse_controls:
  - control: per-IP rate limiting on the public endpoint
    detail: 10 requests / 60s observed. See rate-limits/formboost-rate-limits.yml.
    evidence: live probe 2026-09-02
  - control: body size limit
    detail: The public submission endpoint "rejects oversized bodies."
    evidence: https://formboost.app/security
  - control: spam screening before storage
    detail: Heuristics on every plan; Gemini AI screening from Starter up.
    evidence: https://formboost.app/security
  - control: allowed origins
    detail: >-
      Per-endpoint allowed-origin configuration is offered in the dashboard, so a form alias can
      be restricted to posting from the customer's own domains.
    evidence: https://formboost.app/docs/api-reference-and-config
  - control: non-enumerable aliases
    detail: >-
      A POST to a non-existent alias returns 202, not 404, so the endpoint does not confirm
      whether an alias exists. Observed live 2026-09-02.
    evidence: live probe 2026-09-02

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