E.ON Next has exactly one publicly describable authentication surface, and it is customer sign-in, not developer access: an OpenID Connect / OAuth 2.0 authorization server at https://auth.eonnext.com/, run on Auth0 as the E.ON group CIAM tenant (certificate CN eon-next-uk.eon-ciam.auth0app.com, Cloudflare edge, Let's Encrypt certificate). Its RFC 8414 / OIDC Discovery metadata is served anonymously and completely, so the grant types, endpoints, signing keys and client-authentication methods below are observed fact rather than inference. What the discovery document does NOT imply is a developer programme: there is no published client registration path for a third party, no API-key programme, no partner onboarding and no documented resource server. The application-facing hosts api.eonnext.com and data.eonnext.com sit behind AWS API Gateway and answer every anonymous request with {"message":"Missing Authentication Token"} (HTTP 403), disclosing no scheme at all. Treat this artifact as "how an E.ON Next customer's browser or app authenticates", not "how you get an API credential".
E.ON Next secures its APIs with openIdConnect and oauth2 across 2 declared security schemes, as derived from its OpenAPI definitions. OAuth 2.0 is offered via the authorizationCode, implicit, clientCredentials, password, deviceCode, refreshToken, tokenExchange, and ciba flow(s).
generated: '2026-07-27'
method: searched
source: https://auth.eonnext.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
docs: null
docs_note: >-
There is no human-readable authentication documentation. Everything below was
read out of the authorization server's own anonymous discovery document
(HTTP 200 on 2026-07-27), not out of a developer portal — E.ON Next publishes
none.
description: >-
E.ON Next has exactly one publicly describable authentication surface, and it
is customer sign-in, not developer access: an OpenID Connect / OAuth 2.0
authorization server at https://auth.eonnext.com/, run on Auth0 as the E.ON
group CIAM tenant (certificate CN eon-next-uk.eon-ciam.auth0app.com, Cloudflare
edge, Let's Encrypt certificate). Its RFC 8414 / OIDC Discovery metadata is
served anonymously and completely, so the grant types, endpoints, signing keys
and client-authentication methods below are observed fact rather than
inference. What the discovery document does NOT imply is a developer
programme: there is no published client registration path for a third party,
no API-key programme, no partner onboarding and no documented resource server.
The application-facing hosts api.eonnext.com and data.eonnext.com sit behind
AWS API Gateway and answer every anonymous request with
{"message":"Missing Authentication Token"} (HTTP 403), disclosing no scheme at
all. Treat this artifact as "how an E.ON Next customer's browser or app
authenticates", not "how you get an API credential".
summary:
types: [openIdConnect, oauth2]
api_key_in: []
oauth2_flows: [authorizationCode, implicit, clientCredentials, password, deviceCode, refreshToken, tokenExchange, ciba]
third_party_access: none-published
schemes:
- name: eon-next-ciam-oidc
type: openIdConnect
openIdConnectUrl: https://auth.eonnext.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
issuer: https://auth.eonnext.com/
vendor: Auth0 (Okta) — E.ON group CIAM tenant "eon-ciam", application "eon-next-uk"
sources: [well-known/eon-next-openid-configuration.json]
endpoints:
authorization: https://auth.eonnext.com/authorize
token: https://auth.eonnext.com/oauth/token
userinfo: https://auth.eonnext.com/userinfo
jwks: https://auth.eonnext.com/.well-known/jwks.json
registration: https://auth.eonnext.com/oidc/register
revocation: https://auth.eonnext.com/oauth/revoke
end_session: https://auth.eonnext.com/oidc/logout
device_authorization: https://auth.eonnext.com/oauth/device/code
backchannel_authentication: https://auth.eonnext.com/bc-authorize
mfa_challenge: https://auth.eonnext.com/mfa/challenge
global_token_revocation: https://auth.eonnext.com/oauth/global-token-revocation/connection/{connectionName}
pushed_authorization_request: null
grant_types_supported:
- authorization_code
- client_credentials
- refresh_token
- password
- implicit
- urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code
- urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange
- http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/password-realm
- http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/passwordless/otp
- http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/mfa-oob
- http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/mfa-otp
- http://auth0.com/oauth/grant-type/mfa-recovery-code
response_types_supported: [code, token, id_token, code token, code id_token, token id_token, code token id_token]
response_modes_supported: [query, fragment, form_post]
code_challenge_methods_supported: [S256, plain]
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported:
- client_secret_basic
- client_secret_post
- private_key_jwt
- tls_client_auth
- self_signed_tls_client_auth
- none
token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported: [RS256, RS384, PS256]
id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: [HS256, RS256, PS256]
request_object_signing_alg_values_supported: [RS256, RS384, PS256]
dpop_signing_alg_values_supported: [ES256]
tls_client_certificate_bound_access_tokens: true
request_parameter_supported: true
request_uri_parameter_supported: false
backchannel_logout_supported: true
backchannel_token_delivery_modes_supported: [poll]
subject_types_supported: [public]
claims_supported: [aud, auth_time, created_at, email, email_verified, exp, family_name, given_name, iat, identities, iss, name, nickname, phone_number, picture, sub]
scopes: see scopes/eon-next-scopes.yml
mfa: >-
Multi-factor is a first-class part of this tenant — a dedicated
/mfa/challenge endpoint plus mfa-oob, mfa-otp and mfa-recovery-code grants.
keys:
jwks_file: well-known/eon-next-jwks.json
key_count: 2
algorithms: [RS256]
- name: aws-api-gateway-undisclosed
type: unknown
hosts: [https://api.eonnext.com, https://data.eonnext.com]
observed: >-
HTTP 403 with the 42-byte body {"message":"Missing Authentication Token"} on
every probed path, including /.well-known/*, /openapi.json, /graphql and
/health. This is the canonical AWS API Gateway response for an unmatched or
unauthorised route. It proves a gateway is deployed; it discloses neither the
authorizer type nor any credential model.
documented: false
notes:
- >-
A registration_endpoint (/oidc/register) is advertised, which is OAuth 2.0
Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591). Auth0 advertises it whether or not the
tenant permits open registration; it was NOT exercised, so no claim is made
that a third party can self-register a client.
- >-
No Pushed Authorization Request endpoint and no FAPI profile are advertised,
so this is a mainstream CIAM configuration rather than a regulated
open-banking/open-energy style deployment.
- >-
Britain has no consumer energy data-portability mandate, so there is no
regulated accreditation model (nothing equivalent to Australian CDR ADR
accreditation or an FDX/OAuth data-sharing profile) sitting behind this server.
See review.yml.