EMC · Authentication Profile

Emc Authentication

Authentication

Authentication profile for the two EMC management APIs in this profile. Both are customer-hosted appliance APIs, so there is no EMC-operated authorization server, no OAuth, and no developer-portal API key. Authentication is HTTP Basic against the customer's own array, exchanged for a session token. The mechanics below are read from EMC's own shipped client code rather than from prose, because the reference documentation on developer.dell.com is behind an authenticated portal API.

EMC declares 0 security scheme(s) across its OpenAPI definitions.

Cloud InfrastructureData ManagementData ProtectionEnterprise StorageObject StorageStorageS3 CompatibleFortune 500
Methods: Schemes: 0 OAuth flows: API key in:

Security Schemes

Source

Authentication Profile

emc-authentication.yml Raw ↑
generated: '2026-08-29'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://github.com/EMCECS/python-ecsclient (ecsclient/baseclient.py,
  ecsclient/common/token_request.py) and https://github.com/dell/PyU4V
  (PyU4V/rest_requests.py, PyU4V/univmax_conn.py, PyU4V/version.py) — EMC's own
  first-party client libraries, read on 2026-08-29.
provider: EMC
providerId: emc
description: >-
  Authentication profile for the two EMC management APIs in this profile. Both are
  customer-hosted appliance APIs, so there is no EMC-operated authorization server, no
  OAuth, and no developer-portal API key. Authentication is HTTP Basic against the
  customer's own array, exchanged for a session token. The mechanics below are read from
  EMC's own shipped client code rather than from prose, because the reference
  documentation on developer.dell.com is behind an authenticated portal API.
no_oauth_note: >-
  Neither API declares an OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect flow, and no /.well-known/
  oauth-authorization-server or openid-configuration document is served on any EMC or
  Dell host probed (see well-known/emc-well-known.yml). No scopes/ artifact is written:
  there is no scope surface to record, and an empty OAuthScopes file would be a false
  claim of an authorization model these APIs do not have.
apis:
  - api: EMC ECS Management REST API
    schemes:
      - id: ecs_basic_login
        type: http
        scheme: basic
        in: header
        header: Authorization
        applies_to: The login exchange only
        description: >-
          A username and password are sent as HTTP Basic credentials to the ECS login
          endpoint. The credentials are never used on subsequent resource calls.
      - id: ecs_sds_auth_token
        type: apiKey
        in: header
        header: X-SDS-AUTH-TOKEN
        applies_to: Every ECS Management API call after login
        description: >-
          The login response returns the session token in the `x-sds-auth-token` RESPONSE
          header. Clients read it off the response headers and replay it as the
          `X-SDS-AUTH-TOKEN` REQUEST header on every subsequent call. The header name is
          case-insensitive in practice — EMC's own client writes it lowercase when
          reading and uppercase when sending.
    session:
      login: GET /login
      logout: GET /logout
      logout_force_param: >-
        `force=true` terminates every simultaneous session for the current user, not just
        the calling one.
      whoami: GET /user/whoami
      token_lifetime: >-
        Not published. EMC's client does not encode an expiry; it caches the token to
        disk and re-authenticates when a validation call returns 401, 403 or 415.
      revalidation_signal: >-
        HTTP 401, 403 or 415 on a token-validation call means "token stale, fetch a new
        one". HTTP 500 or anything else is raised as an error rather than retried.
    additional_headers:
      - name: X-EMC-Override
        required: false
        description: >-
          Optional override header exposed by EMC's client as `override_header`. Used to
          force operations the API would otherwise refuse.
      - name: Accept
        required: true
        value: application/json
    transport:
      tls: required
      port: 4443
      certificate_note: >-
        EMC's own client defaults `verify_ssl=False` and explicitly disables urllib3
        warnings, because ECS appliances ship with self-signed certificates by default.
        This is a real posture finding, not a recommendation: the shipped default for the
        first-party client is to not verify the array's certificate.
  - api: EMC Unisphere REST API
    schemes:
      - id: unisphere_basic
        type: http
        scheme: basic
        in: header
        header: Authorization
        applies_to: Every Unisphere for PowerMax REST call
        description: >-
          PyU4V uses requests.auth.HTTPBasicAuth against the Unisphere server for the
          standard flow.
      - id: unisphere_bearer
        type: http
        scheme: bearer
        in: header
        header: Authorization
        applies_to: Token-based sessions
        description: >-
          When a token is supplied, PyU4V applies `Authorization: Bearer <token>` to the
          base headers so it persists across the session. Both models are supported by the
          same client.
    session:
      style: persistent REST session established per connection
      api_version: >-
        Unisphere API version 104 (Unisphere 10.4.0), pinned in the client and overridable
        per connection via `u4v_version`.
    transport:
      tls: required
      port: 8443
      base_paths:
        - /univmax/restapi
        - /univmax/rest
gaps:
  - >-
    No published OpenAPI declares these schemes. The profile is reconstructed from EMC's
    shipped client code; an agent cannot discover it from a machine-readable contract.
  - >-
    No token lifetime, refresh endpoint or rotation policy is published for the ECS
    X-SDS-AUTH-TOKEN. Clients discover expiry only by receiving a 401.
  - >-
    No MFA, mTLS or certificate-bound token option is documented for either API.

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