Cloudchipr Authentication

generated: '2026-09-05'
method: searched
source: >-
  openapi/cloudchipr-enterprise-api-openapi.yml + https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/api-keys +
  https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/cloudchipr-mcp-server +
  https://mcp.cloudchipr.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource +
  https://auth0.cloudchipr.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
summary:
  types: [apiKey, oauth2]
  api_key_in: [header]
  surfaces: 2
  note: >-
    Two surfaces, two different auth models. The REST Enterprise API is apiKey-only
    (`x-api-key` header, single securityScheme applied per-operation). The hosted MCP server is
    OAuth 2.0 against an Auth0 tenant, with an API-key-as-bearer alternative for headless use.

schemes:
  - name: ApiKey
    type: apiKey
    in: header
    parameter: x-api-key
    surface: https://api.cloudchipr.com
    applied_to: 'all 26 operations (per-operation security, no global security block)'
    sources:
      - openapi/cloudchipr-enterprise-api-openapi.yml
      - https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/api-keys
  - name: OAuth2Bearer
    type: oauth2
    surface: https://mcp.cloudchipr.com/mcp
    in: header
    parameter: Authorization
    format: 'Bearer <token>'
    authorization_server: https://auth0.cloudchipr.com
    issuer: https://auth0.cloudchipr.com/
    audience: https://api-bff.cloudchipr.com
    scopes: [openid, profile, email, offline_access]
    pkce: S256
    grant_types: [authorization_code, refresh_token, client_credentials, urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code]
    dynamic_client_registration: https://auth0.cloudchipr.com/oidc/register
    jwks_uri: https://auth0.cloudchipr.com/.well-known/jwks.json
    sources:
      - well-known/cloudchipr-mcp-oauth-protected-resource.json
      - well-known/cloudchipr-auth0-openid-configuration.json
  - name: ApiKeyBearer
    type: http
    scheme: bearer
    surface: https://mcp.cloudchipr.com/mcp
    parameter: Authorization
    format: 'Bearer <C8R_TOKEN>'
    env: C8R_TOKEN
    note: The same in-app CloudChipr API key, presented as a bearer token to the MCP server for headless/CI clients.
    sources:
      - https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/cloudchipr-mcp-server

api_key_lifecycle:
  issued_in: CloudChipr app -> Settings -> API Keys
  docs: https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/api-keys
  docs_last_updated: '2025-10-15'
  max_keys_per_account: 2
  expiry: '1 to 365 days (minimum 1 day, maximum 365 days)'
  expiry_superseded: true
  expiry_superseded_by: https://cloudchipr.com/blog/product-updates-july-1
  expiry_superseded_note: >-
    The 2026-07-01 release notes state "The expiration requirement has also been removed, giving
    teams more flexibility in how they manage long-lived API credentials", and that a "Last Used"
    column was added. The docs page still states a mandatory expiry. The provider has not
    reconciled the two; both are recorded.
  rotation_guidance: >-
    CloudChipr publishes rotation guidance in the docs ("Regularly updating and rotating your API
    keys ... Consider setting an expiration date that aligns with your security policies") and
    secure-storage guidance ("Treat your API keys as sensitive as Read access to cloud accounts and
    resources").
  documented_access_level: read-only
  documented_access_contradiction: >-
    The docs state "API keys provide read-only access to the Cloudchipr API and your cloud
    resources", yet the spec secures three MUTATING operations with the same ApiKey scheme:
    createDataSource (POST /data-sources, 201), updateCategoryStructure
    (PUT /dimensions/category-structure, 204) and ingestCustomData (POST /ingest/{destinationId}).
    Recorded, not resolved. An integrator must confirm write capability empirically.

end_user_authentication:
  mfa: https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/multi-factor-authentication-mfa
  sso:
    - provider: Okta
      docs: https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/single-sign-on-sso-using-okta
    - provider: Azure AD / Entra ID
      docs: https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/single-sign-on-sso-using-azure
  entitlement: 'Organization SSO is a Pro-tier-and-above entitlement (https://cloudchipr.com/pricing).'

cloud_account_authentication:
  model: RBAC / role assumption
  source: https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/security-compliance
  statement: >-
    "Cloudchipr does not use Access Key or Secret Key authentication. Connections with customer
    accounts are mainly done through Role Based Access Control (RBAC)."
  provisioning: >-
    The first-party Terraform module cloudchipr/connect-c8r/cloudchipr (v1.1.9) provisions the
    read-only role CloudChipr assumes in a customer account. See packages/cloudchipr-packages.yml.
  docs:
    - https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/read-only-access-requirements
    - https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/create-custom-roles-and-permissions
    - https://docs.cloudchipr.com/docs/create-custom-roles-and-permissions-in-sub-accounts

observed:
  - url: https://api.cloudchipr.com/
    status: 401
    body: empty
    www_authenticate: none
    checked: '2026-09-05'
    note: >-
      The REST host returns a bare 401 with no body and NO WWW-Authenticate header, so an
      unauthenticated client gets no machine-readable hint about which scheme to use.
  - url: https://mcp.cloudchipr.com/mcp
    status: 401
    body: '{"error":"unauthorized","message":"Bearer token required"}'
    www_authenticate: 'Bearer realm="cloudchipr", error="invalid_token", error_description="No bearer token provided"'
    checked: '2026-09-05'
    note: >-
      The MCP host does it properly - a WWW-Authenticate Bearer challenge, which combined with the
      RFC 9728 protected-resource document is enough for an MCP client to discover the
      authorization server and self-register without human help.

see_also:
  scopes: scopes/cloudchipr-scopes.yml
  conventions: conventions/cloudchipr-conventions.yml
  well_known: well-known/cloudchipr-well-known.yml