Booz Allen Hamilton Authentication

generated: '2026-09-14'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://github.com/boozallen/strands-base-agent/blob/develop/docs/foundry/configuration/environment-variables.md,
  .../docs/foundry/guides/http-api.md, .../security/README.md and
  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/boozallen/palm/main/openapi-specification.yaml — read 2026-09-14
summary: >-
  There is no authentication to document for a Booz Allen API, because there is no Booz Allen API
  to call. Both published contracts in the estate are for self-hosted software: the PALM
  openapi-specification.yaml declares no components.securitySchemes at all, and the Agent Foundry
  strands-base-agent baseline mounts its REST and A2A routes with no authn/authz layer, leaving
  both to the adopter's deployment. This file records that measured absence — it is deliberately
  NOT wired as an `Authentication` pointer in apis.yml, because crediting a documented auth model
  here would assert a posture neither product has.
schemes: []
derived_from_spec:
  file: openapi/booz-allen-hamilton-palm-openapi.yaml
  security_schemes: 0
  note: PALM's published spec has no securitySchemes and no security requirement on its one operation.
runtime_posture:
  product: Agent Foundry — Strands Base Agent
  built_in_authentication: none
  responsibility: adopter (the fork/deployment)
  transport_security:
    tls: configurable in the runtime (TLS config module shipped in strands_base_agent)
    cors:
      env:
        - {name: STRANDS_CORS_ORIGINS, default: localhost dev ports}
        - {name: STRANDS_CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS, default: 'false'}
        - {name: STRANDS_CORS_ALLOW_METHODS, default: 'GET,POST,PUT,DELETE,OPTIONS,HEAD'}
        - {name: STRANDS_CORS_ALLOW_HEADERS, default: 'Accept,Content-Type,Authorization,…'}
  outbound_credentials:
    - surface: MCP servers the agent calls
      mechanism: per-server `headers` in config.yaml with ${VAR} substitution (e.g. Authorization Bearer)
      note: these authenticate the agent TO third-party services; they do not protect the agent's own endpoints
    - surface: AWS Bedrock
      mechanism: AWS_PROFILE / AWS_DEFAULT_REGION and the standard AWS credential chain
  secrets_guidance: >-
    "Secrets (API keys, tokens, AWS credentials) should stay in .env files and never in config.yaml."
  evidence:
    stig_checklist: https://github.com/boozallen/strands-base-agent/blob/develop/security/stig_checklist.json
    note: >-
      The shipped DISA ASD STIG assessment covers the auth and authz domains explicitly; of 286
      findings, 38 are marked `delivery` responsibility and 21 `shared`, which is where the adopter's
      authentication work lands.