Agentcard · Authentication Profile

Agentcard Authentication

Authentication

Agentcard secures its APIs with http and oauth2 across 2 declared security schemes, as derived from its OpenAPI definitions. OAuth 2.0 is offered via the clientCredentials and authorizationCode flow(s).

CompanyPaymentsVirtual CardsCard IssuingAI AgentsAgentic CommerceMCPFintechWalletVisa
Methods: http, oauth2 Schemes: 2 OAuth flows: clientCredentials, authorizationCode API key in:

Security Schemes

platformToken http
scheme: bearer
connectWithAgentcard oauth2

Source

Authentication Profile

Raw ↑ 
generated: '2026-07-17'
method: searched
source: openapi/agentcard-openapi-original.json + https://docs.agentcard.sh/companies/authentication/oauth + https://mcp.agentcard.sh/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs: https://docs.agentcard.sh/companies/api/user-authentication
summary:
  types: [http, oauth2]
  http_schemes: [bearer]
  oauth2_flows: [clientCredentials, authorizationCode]
schemes:
- name: platformToken
  type: http
  scheme: bearer
  description: >-
    Platform access token for the REST v2 API. Mint it via POST /api/v2/oauth/token by
    exchanging client_id + client_secret (OAuth2 client credentials, RFC 6749 §4.4). Send as
    Authorization: Bearer <token>. Tokens live one hour; no refresh token on this grant — re-mint.
  sources: [openapi/agentcard-openapi-original.json]
- name: connectWithAgentcard
  type: oauth2
  flow: authorizationCode
  pkce: required   # S256, enforced for every client including confidential
  authorization_server: https://mcp.agentcard.sh
  authorization_endpoint: https://mcp.agentcard.sh/authorize
  token_endpoint: https://mcp.agentcard.sh/token
  registration_endpoint: https://mcp.agentcard.sh/register
  revocation_endpoint: https://mcp.agentcard.sh/revoke
  resource: https://mcp.agentcard.sh/mcp   # audience-bound, sent on /authorize and /token
  refresh: rotating   # refresh tokens rotate on every refresh — persist the new one
  description: >-
    "Connect with Agentcard" — OAuth 2.1 + PKCE for end-user authorization to the hosted MCP
    server. Confidential clients get an acs_ secret; public (PKCE-only) clients omit it.
    Discoverable via /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server and /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
  sources: [https://mcp.agentcard.sh/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, https://docs.agentcard.sh/companies/authentication/oauth]
notes: >-
  The REST spec declares only the platformToken bearer scheme; the OAuth 2.1 + PKCE end-user
  flow is documented in the Companies auth docs and the MCP authorization-server metadata.
  A headless phone-authentication path exists for messaging agents with no browser moment.