National University of Singapore OAuth Scopes

OAuth 2.0 probed

National University of Singapore uses OAuth 2.0 but publishes no discrete scopes — access is governed by the grant itself (e.g. client-credentials or role-based authorization) rather than per-scope consent.

This index is generated from the provider’s OpenAPI security definitions (and, where available, its documented scope reference) and refreshes on every APIs.io network build. Browse every provider’s scopes at scopes.apis.io.

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Scopes: 0 Flows: Method: probed

Scopes (0)

National University of Singapore implements OAuth 2.0 but publishes no discrete scopes — access is governed by the grant itself (client-credentials or role-based authorization) rather than per-scope consent.

Source

OAuth Scopes

Raw ↑
generated: '2026-08-19'
method: probed
source: >-
  scopes_supported and claims_supported read verbatim from
  https://vafs.nus.edu.sg/adfs/.well-known/openid-configuration (HTTP 200, fetched 2026-08-19)
provider: National University of Singapore
providerId: nus
x-operator: institution
description: >-
  The complete set of OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect scopes the National University of Singapore's
  own authorization server advertises to clients, plus the claims it will assert. These were
  read from the institution's live discovery document, not inferred. NUS publishes no prose
  documentation of these scopes anywhere public — the discovery document is the only
  description of them that exists on the open internet.
authorization_server: https://vafs.nus.edu.sg/adfs
scopes:
- name: openid
  standard: true
  description: Requests an ID token; required for any OpenID Connect flow against this provider.
- name: profile
  standard: true
  description: Requests the end user's basic profile claims.
- name: email
  standard: true
  description: Requests the end user's email address claim.
- name: allatclaims
  standard: false
  vendor: Microsoft ADFS
  description: >-
    ADFS-specific scope that asks the provider to place all claims from the access token into
    the ID token as well. Broad by construction — grant it deliberately, not by default.
- name: user_impersonation
  standard: false
  vendor: Microsoft ADFS
  description: >-
    Permits a client to act on behalf of the signed-in user against a downstream NUS resource.
    The highest-consequence scope this provider advertises.
- name: aza
  standard: false
  vendor: Microsoft ADFS
  description: Broker/primary-refresh-token scope used by Microsoft device authentication brokers.
- name: logon_cert
  standard: false
  vendor: Microsoft ADFS
  description: Requests a logon certificate for the authenticated user.
- name: vpn_cert
  standard: false
  vendor: Microsoft ADFS
  description: Requests a VPN client certificate for the authenticated user.
- name: winhello_cert
  standard: false
  vendor: Microsoft ADFS
  description: Requests a Windows Hello for Business certificate for the authenticated user.
claims_supported:
- aud
- iss
- iat
- exp
- auth_time
- nonce
- at_hash
- c_hash
- sub
- upn
- unique_name
- pwd_url
- pwd_exp
- mfa_auth_time
- sid
- nbf
notes: >-
  Three of the nine advertised scopes (logon_cert, vpn_cert, winhello_cert) mint credentials
  rather than grant data access, and two more (allatclaims, user_impersonation) are broad by
  design. Only three are standard OIDC scopes. An agent integrating with NUS should request
  `openid profile email` and nothing else; the remainder exist for Microsoft device and VPN
  enrolment flows and have no third-party use case.