Lloyd's of London OAuth Scopes

generated: '2026-07-25'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://web.archive.org/web/20200930095802/https://developer.lloyds.com/Get-Started/Base-API-Standard
  (section 5.12.1 API Consumer Security Rules)
docs: https://web.archive.org/web/20200930085423/https://developer.lloyds.com/Get-Started/Authentication-Information
description: >-
  Lloyd's market APIs do not publish a granular OAuth scope catalogue. The Base API Standard
  mandates exactly one scope value on the consumer's bearer token - the Azure AD delegated
  permission "user_impersonation" - and pushes all finer-grained authorisation onto JWT claims
  evaluated by the API Provider rather than onto scopes. This is a deliberately coarse scope
  surface: possession of a registered X.509 certificate plus a user_impersonation on-behalf-of
  token is the access decision, and per-resource authorisation is done from sub/upn/lmg_* claims
  inside the provider.
identity_provider: Azure Active Directory (LIMOSS Common Services tenant, one per environment)
schemes:
- name: AzureADBearer
  type: oauth2
  source: Lloyd's Base API Standard section 5.12.1
  flows:
  - flow: authorizationCode
    authority: https://login.microsoftonline.com/{tenantId}
  - flow: on-behalf-of
    grant_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer
scopes:
- scope: user_impersonation
  claim: scp
  required: true
  description: >-
    The only scope value the Lloyd's Base API Standard names. "The JWT MUST contain a claim
    called 'scp' and it must have the value of 'user_impersonation'." If the token returned from
    the login does not already carry it, the application must obtain an on-behalf-of token from
    Azure AD that does.
  flows: [authorizationCode, on-behalf-of]
  sources: ["Lloyd's Base API Standard section 5.12.1"]
authorization_beyond_scopes:
  mechanism: JWT claim evaluation by the API Provider
  claims: [sub, upn, amr, aud, iss, appid, oid, lmg_mpo, lmg_cert_dn, lmg_pkt]
  note: >-
    "The API Provider may use any field in the JWT for authorisation purposes." Multi-factor
    authentication is signalled by an "amr" claim containing "mfa".
gaps:
- No scopes/permissions reference page is published; the developer portal that carried the Base
  API Standard now redirects to www.lloyds.com.
- The published OIDC discovery documents at /discovery/.well-known/openid-configuration carry only
  issuer and jwks_uri - no scopes_supported, authorization_endpoint or token_endpoint - so the
  scope set cannot be enumerated from discovery.
related:
- authentication/lloyds-of-london-authentication.yml
- well-known/lloyds-of-london-well-known.yml