Clay · OAuth Scopes

Clay OAuth Scopes

OAuth 2.0 probed

Clay publishes 1 OAuth 2.0 scope. Scopes are the fine-grained permissions an application requests at authorization time to act against the Clay API on a user’s behalf.

This index is generated from the provider’s OpenAPI security definitions (and, where available, its documented scope reference) and refreshes on every APIs.io network build. Browse every provider’s scopes at scopes.apis.io.

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Scopes: 1 Flows: Method: probed

Scopes (1)

Scope	Description	Flows
mcp	The single scope Clay's authorization server advertises. It gates the whole MCP surface — search, routines and tables alike — as one grant.	authorizationCode, deviceCode

📄 Provider scope reference: https://developers.clay.com/concepts/cli-basics

Source

OAuth Scopes

generated: '2026-08-14'
method: probed
source: https://api.clay.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs: https://developers.clay.com/concepts/cli-basics
note: >-
  Clay's OpenAPI declares NO oauth2 security scheme — the Public API is api-key only
  (`clay-api-key` header), so derive-oauth-scopes.py correctly found nothing in the spec.
  But Clay does run a real OAuth 2.0 authorization server, published as RFC 8414 metadata
  at https://api.clay.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, and it is what gates the
  `clay` CLI and the remote MCP server at https://api.clay.com/v3/mcp. The scope surface
  below is read verbatim from that metadata document, not inferred.
applies_to:
- surface: MCP server
  url: https://api.clay.com/v3/mcp
- surface: clay CLI
  command: clay login
does_not_apply_to:
- surface: Public API
  url: https://api.clay.com/public/v0
  auth: apiKey header clay-api-key
authorization_server:
  issuer: https://api.clay.com
  authorization_endpoint: https://app.clay.com/oauth/authorize
  token_endpoint: https://api.clay.com/oauth/token
  device_authorization_endpoint: https://api.clay.com/oauth/device_authorization
  registration_endpoint: https://api.clay.com/oauth/register
  revocation_endpoint: https://api.clay.com/oauth/revoke
  metadata_file: well-known/clay-com-oauth-authorization-server.json
flows:
- flow: authorizationCode
  authorizationUrl: https://app.clay.com/oauth/authorize
  tokenUrl: https://api.clay.com/oauth/token
  pkce: [S256]
- flow: deviceCode
  grant_type: 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code'
  deviceAuthorizationUrl: https://api.clay.com/oauth/device_authorization
  note: Used by `clay login --device` on headless machines.
- flow: refreshToken
  grant_type: refresh_token
scopes:
- scope: mcp
  description: >-
    The single scope Clay's authorization server advertises. It gates the whole MCP
    surface — search, routines and tables alike — as one grant.
  flows: [authorizationCode, deviceCode]
  sources: [well-known/clay-com-oauth-authorization-server.json]
  resource: https://api.clay.com/v3/mcp
scope_count: 1
protected_resources:
- resource: https://api.clay.com/v3/mcp
  authorization_servers: [https://api.clay.com]
  scopes_supported: [mcp]
  metadata: well-known/clay-com-oauth-protected-resource.json
  discovery: >-
    Advertised in the WWW-Authenticate header on an unauthenticated POST:
    Bearer resource_metadata="https://api.clay.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/v3/mcp"
observations:
  granularity: coarse
  note: >-
    One scope for the entire agent surface means consent is all-or-nothing: an agent
    authorized to read a search is equally authorized to run credit-consuming enrichment
    routines and, on Enterprise, to query customer tables. There is no read-only scope and
    no per-primitive scope. Worth flagging to the provider.
  strengths:
  - RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata published and reachable anonymously
  - RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata published, correctly linked from WWW-Authenticate
  - PKCE S256 supported
  - dynamic client registration supported (RFC 7591)
  - device-code grant supported for headless agents
  - token revocation endpoint published
  gaps:
  - no openid-configuration (Clay is an OAuth authorization server, not an OIDC provider)
  - single coarse scope; no least-privilege option
  - the Public API sits outside this model entirely, on long-lived api keys with no scoping