Cerapedics OAuth Scopes

generated: '2026-08-02'
method: probed
source: https://mcp.cerapedics.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
note: >-
  Cerapedics publishes no OpenAPI, so 0-working/derive-oauth-scopes.py had nothing to
  read. These scopes come from the live RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata and the
  RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata, which are the provider's own published scope
  declarations. No scopes-reference documentation page exists.
docs: null
schemes:
- name: mcp_oauth2
  source: well-known/cerapedics-oauth-protected-resource.json
  resource: https://mcp.cerapedics.com/mcp
  flows:
  - flow: authorizationCode
    authorizationUrl: https://login.microsoftonline.com/901bf24d-83de-4486-804c-8c263fdb31f4/oauth2/v2.0/authorize
    tokenUrl: https://login.microsoftonline.com/901bf24d-83de-4486-804c-8c263fdb31f4/oauth2/v2.0/token
scopes:
- scope: https://mcp.cerapedics.com/mcp/user_impersonation
  description: Delegated access to the Cerapedics MCP server, acting on the signed-in
    user's behalf. The single resource-specific scope this API declares.
  kind: resource
  flows: [authorizationCode]
  sources: [well-known/cerapedics-oauth-protected-resource.json, well-known/cerapedics-oauth-authorization-server.json]
- scope: openid
  description: OpenID Connect sign-in; issue an ID token.
  kind: standard
  flows: [authorizationCode]
  sources: [well-known/cerapedics-oauth-authorization-server.json]
- scope: profile
  description: Basic profile claims for the signed-in user.
  kind: standard
  flows: [authorizationCode]
  sources: [well-known/cerapedics-oauth-authorization-server.json]
- scope: offline_access
  description: Issue a refresh token so the client can renew access without user
    interaction.
  kind: standard
  flows: [authorizationCode]
  sources: [well-known/cerapedics-oauth-authorization-server.json]
observations:
- >-
  The scope model is coarse: one blanket user_impersonation scope governs the entire
  MCP tool surface, so there is no per-tool or read-vs-write separation an agent
  runtime could use to constrain what a delegated token may do.
x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-08-02'
  urls:
  - {url: 'https://mcp.cerapedics.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource', http_status: 200}
  - {url: 'https://mcp.cerapedics.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', http_status: 200}