Britive OAuth Scopes

generated: '2026-08-08'
method: probed
source: https://demo.britive-app.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
docs: https://docs.britive.com/apidocs/api-prerequisites
x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-08-08'
  url: https://demo.britive-app.com/.well-known/openid-configuration
  http_status: 200
  content_type: application/json
  control: 'https://demo.britive-app.com/.well-known/zzz-control-not-real.json -> 404 (not an SPA catch-all)'
summary: >-
  Britive's REST API is documented as bearer-token only and its OpenAPI declares a single
  http/bearer security scheme with no oauth2 flows and no scopes. A real OAuth 2.0 /
  OpenID Connect authorization server does exist on every tenant — it backs SSO and the
  OAuth-protected MCP endpoint — and it advertises three coarse scopes. Those scopes are
  recorded here verbatim from discovery. They are NOT per-operation API scopes: nothing in
  either OpenAPI maps an operation to a scope.
authorization_server:
  issuer: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2
  authorization_endpoint: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2/authorize
  token_endpoint: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2/token
  introspection_endpoint: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2/introspect
  revocation_endpoint: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2/revoke
  registration_endpoint: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2/register
  jwks_uri: https://{tenant}.britive-app.com/api/auth/sso/oauth2/keys
  grant_types_supported: [authorization_code, refresh_token, client_credentials]
  response_types_supported: [code, token]
  code_challenge_methods_supported: [S256]
  token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [client_secret_basic, client_secret_post]
  dynamic_client_registration: true
scopes:
- name: read
  description: Read access. Britive publishes no per-resource breakdown of what `read` grants.
  source: openid-configuration scopes_supported
- name: write
  description: Write access. Britive publishes no per-resource breakdown of what `write` grants.
  source: openid-configuration scopes_supported
- name: profile
  description: Access to the authenticated subject's profile claims.
  source: openid-configuration scopes_supported
claims_supported: [sub, aud, iss, exp, iat, scope]
gaps:
- >-
  No scope is bound to any of the 443 published REST operations. `security: [{bearerAuth: []}]`
  is declared globally and never refined per operation, so a client cannot compute least
  privilege from the contract.
- >-
  The three scopes (read/write/profile) are coarse for a privileged-access product whose own
  value proposition is least privilege — there is no scope granularity matching the platform's
  own resource model (profiles, secrets, policies, identities, audit).
- >-
  id_token_signing_alg_values_supported is advertised as ["S256"]. S256 is a PKCE code-challenge
  method, not a JWS signing algorithm (JWA names are RS256, ES256, etc.). This value is not a
  valid `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` entry under OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0.