Authologic OAuth Scopes

generated: '2026-09-14'
method: searched
source: openapi/authologic-customer-api-openapi.yml (components.securitySchemes.oauth2),
  well-known/authologic-sandbox-oauth-authorization-server.json (RFC 8414, probed 2026-09-14),
  https://developer.authologic.com/sitemap.xml (95 URLs, no scopes or permissions page),
  https://developer.authologic.com/docs/technical/implementation
docs: https://developer.authologic.com/docs/technical/implementation
specification: API Commons OAuth Scopes
specificationVersion: '0.1'
provider: Authologic
providerId: authologic
scope_count: 0
description: >-
  Authologic operates an OAuth 2.0 authorization server but publishes no scopes. This artifact records
  that measured absence rather than omitting the file, because "OAuth exists but is unscoped" is a
  materially different fact from "no OAuth".
schemes:
  - name: oauth2
    source: openapi/authologic-customer-api-openapi.yml
    flows:
      - flow: clientCredentials
        tokenUrl: https://sandbox.authologic.com/api/oauth2/token
        scopes: {}
scopes: []
findings:
  - >-
    The clientCredentials flow in the contract declares an EMPTY scopes object. No operation carries a
    per-operation scope requirement — security is declared once at the document level as
    [{apiKey: []}, {oauth2: []}] and every operation inherits it with an empty scope list.
  - >-
    The RFC 8414 authorization server metadata at
    https://sandbox.authologic.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server omits scopes_supported
    entirely. An RFC 8414 server that supported scopes would normally advertise them there.
  - >-
    No scopes, permissions or roles reference page exists in the developer documentation. All 95 URLs in
    the sitemap were checked; the implementation notes cover authentication without mentioning scopes.
  - >-
    Authorization is therefore account- and environment-scoped. A credential is entitled to the products
    the account has contracted for, in the environment the key belongs to. There is no way to mint a
    narrower token — a token that can read a conversation can also create one and delete its data.
implication_for_agents: >-
  Least privilege is not achievable on this API today. An agent given credentials to read verification
  results holds the same authority as one permitted to create billable conversations and to issue
  DELETE_DATA. The mitigation available now is operational, not contractual: separate accounts per use
  case, and the mTLS/DPoP binding the authorization server advertises (see
  authentication/authologic-authentication.yml) to at least bind the credential to a workload.
maintainers:
  - FN: Kin Lane
    email: kin@apievangelist.com