La Ruche qui dit Oui! — API Evangelist enhancements

overlay: 1.0.0
info:
  title: La Ruche qui dit Oui! — API Evangelist enhancements
  version: 1.0.0
  x-description: >-
    OpenAPI Overlay capturing API Evangelist's enrichment of The Food Assembly
    API description. The base document is itself a faithful conversion of the
    provider's published API Blueprint; this overlay adds only the annotations
    we contribute — agentic action classification, runtime-drift warnings, and
    cross-links to the derived artifacts in this repository. It never restates
    provider content as our own and never mutates the base document.
  x-generated: '2026-07-19'
  x-method: generated
  x-source: openapi/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-api-openapi.yml
extends: ../openapi/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-api-openapi.yml
actions:
- target: $.info
  description: Cross-link the derived artifacts and flag documentation staleness.
  update:
    x-api-evangelist:
      repo: https://github.com/api-evangelist/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui
      artifacts:
        conventions: conventions/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-conventions.yml
        errors: errors/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-problem-types.yml
        authentication: authentication/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-authentication.yml
        lifecycle: lifecycle/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-lifecycle.yml
        conformance: conformance/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-conformance.yml
        data_model: data-model/la-ruche-qui-dit-oui-data-model.yml
    x-documentation-staleness:
      source_last_updated: '2017-04-06'
      probed: '2026-07-19'
      status: stale
      detail: >-
        The provider's documentation has not changed since 2017 while the
        deployment has moved on. Verify every route before integrating.
- target: $.info
  description: Record the absence of a published lifecycle and support contract.
  update:
    x-lifecycle:
      versioning_policy: none
      deprecation_policy: none
      status_page: none
      sla: none
- target: $.paths['/oauth/v2/token/'].post
  description: Warn that the documented token endpoint no longer resolves.
  update:
    x-runtime-drift:
      probed: '2026-07-19'
      observed_status: 404
      observed_body: '{"problemType":"/exception","title":"","detail":[]}'
      detail: >-
        The documented token endpoint returned 404 on the live host. Token
        acquisition as documented is not currently reproducible.
    x-agentic-access:
      action_class: authenticate
      consequence: credential_exchange
      escalation: never_autonomous
      detail: >-
        Password grant requires handling end-user credentials directly. An agent
        should never collect or replay these; broker a token out of band.
- target: $.paths['/me/'].get
  description: Classify the membership lookup for agentic access.
  update:
    x-agentic-access:
      action_class: read
      consequence: none
      scope: member_profile
      escalation: none
- target: $.paths['/distribution/{id}/products/'].get
  description: Classify the public catalogue read and record drift.
  update:
    x-agentic-access:
      action_class: read
      consequence: none
      scope: public_catalogue
      escalation: none
    x-runtime-drift:
      probed: '2026-07-19'
      observed_status: 404
      detail: Documented public route returned 404 for distribution id 1 on the live host.
- target: $.paths['/orders/'].get
  description: Classify the order listing and note the missing pagination contract.
  update:
    x-agentic-access:
      action_class: read
      consequence: none
      scope: member_orders
      escalation: none
    x-pagination:
      supported: false
      detail: >-
        Returns a count plus the full orders array with no limit, offset or
        cursor parameter. Unbounded response growth is a real risk for
        long-tenured members.
- target: $.paths['/distributions/{id}/basket/confirm/'].post
  description: Flag basket confirmation as an unguarded money-movement operation.
  update:
    x-agentic-access:
      action_class: write
      consequence: money_movement
      scope: member_orders
      escalation: human_confirmation_required
    x-idempotency:
      supported: false
      risk: high
      detail: >-
        No idempotency key is accepted. A retried or replayed confirmation has
        no documented protection against generating a duplicate payment
        hand-off. Do not retry automatically.
- target: $.paths['/orders/{id}/payments/'].post
  description: Flag order repayment as an unguarded money-movement operation.
  update:
    x-agentic-access:
      action_class: write
      consequence: money_movement
      scope: member_orders
      escalation: human_confirmation_required
    x-idempotency:
      supported: false
      risk: high
      detail: >-
        No idempotency key is accepted on a retry-shaped operation. Repayment is
        by definition invoked after a failure, which is exactly when blind
        retries cause double charges.
- target: $.components.securitySchemes.oauth2
  description: Record the security posture of the documented grant.
  update:
    x-security-posture:
      rfc9700_compliant: false
      detail: >-
        Resource-owner password credentials grant only. RFC 9700 recommends
        against it and OAuth 2.1 removes it. No PKCE, no authorization code
        flow, no scopes.
- target: $.components.schemas.OrderState
  description: Note the redundant status/state pair.
  update:
    x-modelling-note: >-
      Orders carry both a numeric `state` enum and a coarser string `status`
      (basket / order). The two overlap; `state` is the authoritative lifecycle
      value.