API Evangelist enhancements for the Crypto.com Exchange REST API v1

overlay: 1.0.0
info:
  title: API Evangelist enhancements for the Crypto.com Exchange REST API v1
  version: 1.0.0
extends: openapi/crypto-com-exchange-openapi.yml
x-generated: '2026-08-11'
x-method: generated
x-source: >-
  Derived from https://exchange-developer.crypto.com/exchange/v1/docs/api/rest-common-api-reference and
  the artifacts in this repository. Never applied to the harvested spec in openapi/_original/.
x-rationale: >-
  The published spec is unusually complete on content - 95 operations, every one tagged with a unique
  operationId, a summary, a description and 200/400/408/429/500 responses, 221 component schemas and 560
  in-spec examples - but it declares NO components.securitySchemes and no top-level security, even though
  85 of the 95 operations document a 401 response. An agent reading only the contract cannot discover how
  to authenticate. These actions add the auth contract and the runtime semantics that live only in prose.
actions:
  - target: $.info
    update:
      x-apievangelist-profile: https://apievangelist.com/providers/crypto-com
      x-apievangelist-reviewed: '2026-08-11'
      x-contact-docs: https://exchange-developer.crypto.com/exchange/v1/docs/api/rest-common-api-reference

  - target: $.components
    update:
      securitySchemes:
        ExchangeHmacSignature:
          type: apiKey
          in: header
          name: api_key
          description: >-
            NOT a header in practice - documented here because OpenAPI 3.0 has no vocabulary for a
            body-carried HMAC signature. Private methods carry api_key, sig and nonce inside the JSON
            request body. sig is the hex-encoded HMAC-SHA256 of
            (method + id + api_key + parameter_string + nonce), keyed with the API secret, where
            parameter_string is the request params sorted by key ascending and concatenated as key+value
            with no separators. nonce is a millisecond epoch timestamp and is rejected with reason code
            40102 INVALID_NONCE if it differs from server time by more than 60 seconds. Keys are issued in
            the Exchange User Center, default to read-only, and may be bound to an IP allowlist.
          x-signing-string: method + id + api_key + parameter_string + nonce
          x-algorithm: HMAC-SHA256, hex-encoded
          x-carried-in: request-body
          x-docs: https://exchange-developer.crypto.com/exchange/v1/docs/api/rest-common-api-reference

  - target: $.info
    update:
      x-rate-limits:
        source: rate-limits/crypto-com-rate-limits.yml
        response_headers: none
        exhaustion:
          http_status: 429
          code: 42901
        note: >-
          Limits are published as numbers only. No X-RateLimit-*, RateLimit-* or Retry-After header is
          returned, so a client must model the limits rather than read them.
      x-error-catalog:
        source: errors/crypto-com-error-codes.yml
        format: proprietary
        note: >-
          The in-body `code` is authoritative alongside the HTTP status. Two failure-shaped outcomes
          (40401 NOT_FOUND, 43012 SELF_TRADE_PREVENTION) are returned with HTTP 200.
      x-idempotency:
        supported: false
        note: >-
          The Exchange order path has no idempotency key. client_oid gives duplicate REJECTION
          (204 DUPLICATE_CLORDID / 40006 DUPLICATE_REQUEST), not idempotent replay. Crypto.com Pay,
          a different API, does accept an Idempotency-Key header on refunds.
      x-sandbox:
        server: https://uat-api.3ona.co/exchange/v1
        note: Already declared in servers[]; recorded here for artifact cross-linking.
      x-deprecation-policy:
        url: https://exchange-developer.crypto.com/exchange/v1/docs/api/rest-breaking-change-schedule
        sunset_header: false
        note: Dated HTML schedule only; no RFC 8594 Sunset/Deprecation headers and no deprecated operations.

  - target: $.paths['/private/create-order'].post
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action-class: acting
        consequence: physical
        audit: required
        note: >-
          Places a live order against real funds. Crypto.com's own CLI classifies this at the `mutate`
          safety tier, requiring acknowledged=true over MCP and --yes on the command line.

  - target: $.paths['/private/create-withdrawal'].post
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action-class: acting
        consequence: physical
        audit: required
        human-in-the-loop: required
        note: >-
          Moves assets off the platform. Crypto.com's own CLI classifies this at the `dangerous` safety
          tier, which the MCP server refuses entirely unless started with --allow-dangerous.

  - target: $.paths['/private/cancel-all-orders'].post
    update:
      x-agentic-access:
        action-class: acting
        consequence: safety-critical
        audit: required
        human-in-the-loop: required
        note: >-
          Bulk, irreversible cancellation. Classified `dangerous` in the provider's own tool catalog.