openapi: 3.1.0
info:
title: OpenLaws API Documentation Courts Opinions API
version: 1.0.4
description: OpenLaws Legal Data API
contact:
name: OpenLaws PBC
url: https://openlaws.us/api
email: team@openlaws.us
license:
name: Commercial
url: https://openlaws.us/terms
servers:
- url: https://api.openlaws.us
security:
- bearerAuth: []
tags:
- name: Opinions
description: Opinions represent published and unpublished case law opinions. Opinions belong to a Court and Jurisdiction.
paths:
/api/v1/jurisdictions/{jurisdiction_key}/opinions/search:
get:
summary: Keyword Search Case Opinions
description: BM25 keyword search of case opinion text.
tags:
- Opinions
parameters:
- $ref: '#/components/parameters/jurisdictionKeyParam'
- name: query
in: query
required: true
schema:
type: string
example: elections
description: One or more keywords to search by
- $ref: '#/components/parameters/queryTypeParam'
- $ref: '#/components/parameters/withFederalParam'
- name: filing_start_date
description: Filter opinions to those that were filed on or after this ISO date.
in: query
required: false
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/NullableDate'
examples:
start_date:
value: '2020-01-01'
no_start_date:
value: -Infinity
- name: filing_end_date
description: Filter opinions to those that were filed before or on this ISO date.
in: query
required: false
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/NullableDate'
examples:
end_date:
value: '2020-12-31'
no_end_date:
value: Infinity
- name: court_keys
in: query
required: false
schema:
type: string
default: false
example: ca1,scotus
description: Comma delimited list of court_keys. See GET /jurisdictions/{jurisdiction_key}/courts for valid court_keys. For the FED jurisdiction, 'first_circuit'...'eleventh_circuit', 'dc_circuit', and 'federal_circuit' are also valid values which expand to all courts in that circuit.
- $ref: '#/components/parameters/limitParam'
responses:
'200':
$ref: '#/components/responses/okArrayOfOpinions'
'400':
$ref: '#/components/responses/badRequest'
'401':
$ref: '#/components/responses/unauthorized'
'404':
$ref: '#/components/responses/notFound'
'500':
$ref: '#/components/responses/serverError'
operationId: keywordSearchOpinions
/api/v1/jurisdictions/{jurisdiction_key}/opinions/citations:
get:
summary: Lookup Case Opinion by Jurisdiction and Bluebook legal citation for a case
description: Long form with parties or short form of case citations (volume-number reporter-abbreviation first-page-number) will work.
tags:
- Opinions
parameters:
- $ref: '#/components/parameters/jurisdictionKeyParam'
- name: query
in: query
required: true
schema:
type: string
example: 347 U.S. 483
description: Bluebook legal citation for a case
responses:
'200':
$ref: '#/components/responses/okArrayOfOpinions'
'400':
$ref: '#/components/responses/badRequest'
'401':
$ref: '#/components/responses/unauthorized'
'404':
$ref: '#/components/responses/notFound'
'500':
$ref: '#/components/responses/serverError'
operationId: lookupOpinionByBluebookCitation
components:
responses:
badRequest:
description: 400 Bad Request. Please check your jurisdiction and citation format.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
notFound:
description: 404 Not Found
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
okArrayOfOpinions:
description: Array of Opinions
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: array
items:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Opinion'
serverError:
description: 500 Internal Server Error
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
unauthorized:
description: 401 Unauthorized. Please check your API Bearer token.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
schemas:
Opinion:
description: Court opinions that resembles the CourtListener schema but is modeled to be focused on the Opinion as the central concept.
type: object
properties:
case_name:
type: string
example: Brown v. Board of Education
description: Full case name including first and second parties
jurisdiction_key:
type: string
example: FED
description: Two to three letter Jurisdiction Key. `FED` for federal and generally, the postal abbreviation for most U.S. states and territories.
court:
description: Court
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Court'
docket_number:
type: string
example: NO. 1
description: Court docket identifier for the opinion
date_filed:
type: string
format: date
example: '1954-05-17'
description: Date which the opinion was filed (ISO formatted date)
judges:
type: string
example: Warren
description: Name of judges if available
attorneys:
type: string
example: Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. Louis L. Redding and Jack Green-berg argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall on the reargument., On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. Redding, Jack Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves, Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4. Arthur D. Shores and A. T. Walden were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2., Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General., John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart Whipple., J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore argued the cause for appellees in No. 4 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. On the briefs in No. 4 were J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore, Archibald O. Robertson, John W. Riely and T. Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees., H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special Deputy Attorney General., By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause for the United States on the reargument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip Elman filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10., Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido and Theodore Leskes for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American Federation of Teachers. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in No. 10 were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and by Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.
description: Name of attorneys if available
first_party:
type: string
example: Brown
second_party:
type: string
example: Board of Education
precedential_status:
type: string
example: Published
description: Published or unpublished
headmatter:
type: string
example: '## Parties
BROWN et al.
<em>
v.
</em>
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA et al.
## Docket Number
NO. 1.
## Other Date
Argued December 9, 1952.
## Other Date
Reargued December 8, 1953.
## Decision Date
Decided May 17, 1954.
## Attorneys
<em>
Robert L. Carter
</em>
argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument.
<em>
Thurgood Marshall
</em>
argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument and
<em>
Spottswood W. Robinson, III,
</em>
for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument.
<em>
Louis L. Redding
</em>
and
<em>
Jack Green-berg
</em>
argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and
<em>
Jack Greenberg
</em>
and
<em>
Thurgood Marshall
</em>
on the reargument.
## Attorneys
On the briefs were
<em>
Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. Redding, Jack Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves, Harold R. Boulware
</em>
and
<em>
Oliver W. Hill
</em>
for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10;
<em>
George M. Johnson
</em>
for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and
<em>
Loren Miller
</em>
for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4.
<em>
Arthur D. Shores
</em>
and
<em>
A. T. Walden
</em>
were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2.
## Attorneys
<em>
Paul E. Wilson,
</em>
Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was
<em>
Harold R. Fatzer,
</em>
Attorney General.
## Attorneys
<em>
John W. Davis
</em>
argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were
<em>
T. C. Callison,
</em>
Attorney General of South Carolina,
<em>
Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher
</em>
and
<em>
Taggart Whipple.
</em>
## Attorneys
<em>
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,
</em>
Attorney General of Virginia, and
<em>
T. Justin Moore
</em>
argued the cause for appellees in No. 4 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. On the briefs in No. 4 were
<em>
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,
</em>
Attorney General, and
<em>
Henry T. Wickham,
</em>
Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and
<em>
T. Justin Moore, Archibald O. Robertson, John W. Riely
</em>
and
<em>
T. Justin Moore, Jr.
</em>
for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees.
## Attorneys
<em>
H. Albert Young,
</em>
Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was
<em>
Louis J. Finger,
</em>
Special Deputy Attorney General.
## Attorneys
By special leave of Court,
<em>
Assistant Attorney General Rankin
</em>
argued the cause for the United States on the reargument, as
<em>
amicus curiae,
</em>
urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. With him on the brief were
<em>
Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont
</em>
and
<em>
M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery,
</em>
then Attorney General, and
<em>
Philip Elman
</em>
filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as
<em>
amicus curiae,
</em>
urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10.
## Attorneys
Briefs of
<em>
amici curiae
</em>
supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by
<em>
Shad Polier, Will Maslow
</em>
and
<em>
Joseph B. Robison
</em>
for the American Jewish Congress; by
<em>
Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido
</em>
and
<em>
Theodore Leskes
</em>
for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by
<em>
John Ligtenberg
</em>
and
<em>
Selma M. Borchardt
</em>
for the American Federation of Teachers. Briefs of
<em>
amici curiae
</em>
supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in No. 10 were filed by
<em>
Arthur J. Goldberg
</em>
and
<em>
Thomas E. Harris
</em>
for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and by
<em>
Phineas Indritz
</em>
for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.'
description: Markdown of headmatter if available
extracted_by_ocr:
type: boolean
example: false
description: Whether or not OCR was used to extract the text
plaintext_content:
type: string
example: '347 U.S. 483 (1954)
BROWN ET AL.
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.
No. 1.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 9, 1952.
Reargued December 8, 1953.
Decided May 17, 1954.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.[*]*484 Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. Louis L. Redding and Jack Greenberg argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall on the reargument.
On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. Redding, Jack Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves, Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4. Arthur D. Shores and A. T. Walden were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2.
Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General.
John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart Whipple.
*485 J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore argued the cause for appellees in No. 4 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. On the briefs in No. 4 were J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore, Archibald G. Robertson, John W. Riely and T. Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees.
H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special Deputy Attorney General.
By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause for the United States on the reargument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip Elman filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10.
Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido and Theodore Leskes for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American Federation of Teachers. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in No. 10 were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris *486 for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and by Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.[1]
*487 In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, *488 they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction.[2] Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.[3]
*489 Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment''s history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time.[4] In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported *490 by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race.[5] The doctrine of *491 "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation.[6] American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education.[7] In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged.[8] In more recent cases, all on the graduate school *492 level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors.[9] Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout *493 the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." *494 Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."[10]
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.[11] Any language *495 in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[12]
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term.[13] The Attorney General *496 of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954.[14]
It is so ordered.
NOTES
[*] Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the
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# Full source: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/api-evangelist/openlaws/refs/heads/main/openapi/openlaws-opinions-api-openapi.yml