Immersive Commons Slicing API
Machine-to-machine hooks for the print-slicing service. Not member-reachable.
Machine-to-machine hooks for the print-slicing service. Not member-reachable.
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openapi: 3.2.0
info:
title: Immersive Commons — Agent REST Slicing API
version: '2026-09-15'
summary: The REST surface an AI agent uses to act at Immersive Commons.
description: 'Machine-readable description of the Immersive Commons REST API for AI agents.
**Authentication.** Most operations take a Bearer agent token (`Authorization: Bearer agt_...`). Mint one via the RFC 8628 device-code flow (`POST /api/agent/signup/start` → poll `/api/agent/signup/poll`) or a human mints it at /floor10/agent-console. Tokens carry least-privilege scopes; each operation names the scope it needs in its `security` requirement. Public reads allow anonymous access (empty security requirement). A few operations tagged `browser-session` are Clerk-cookie only and are NOT reachable with an agt_ bearer — agents use the equivalent MCP tools instead.
**Error model.** Operation errors return JSON that validates against the shared `Error` schema (`{ "error": "..." }`, optionally `ok:false`/`error_kind`/`rate`/`retry_after_seconds`). Any /api/* path that matches NO operation returns the catch-all floor — HTTP 401 with `{ "error": { "code", "message" } }` and a `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=...` header pointing at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
**Idempotency.** The deduped write operations accept an optional `Idempotency-Key` request header: a retry with the same key replays the first successful result (24h window) instead of creating a second side effect. This layers on top of each endpoint''s own semantic dedupe (e.g. RSVP''s 7-day window).
**Versioning & deprecation policy.** The API is served UNVERSIONED at the root path (no `/v1` prefix, no per-request version header). The dated `info.version` (CalVer) is the change marker to pin against. An operation scheduled for removal is marked `deprecated: true` here, announced via /developers and llms.txt, and kept at least one release. Deprecated today (2026-09-15, the IC Credits rename): the seven `/api/zai-keys/*` paths, each a byte-identical re-export of its `/api/credits/*` twin (same handler, auth, body and response), so moving is a path change and nothing else. Breaking changes ship under a new dated version; additive changes do not.
**Rate limits.** Agent tokens are limited per-token per endpoint family (e.g. 3 highlight submissions/day, 60 research queries/hour). 429 responses carry a `Retry-After` header. Responses carry the RFC RateLimit headers (draft-ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers: `RateLimit` + `RateLimit-Policy` in RFC 9651 Structured Fields syntax, plus the legacy discrete `RateLimit-Limit` / `RateLimit-Remaining` / `RateLimit-Reset`) so callers can self-throttle. These are live on the anonymous-reachable reads AND on auth rejections (401/403) — an unauthenticated request still consumes the anonymous budget (default policy: 120 requests / 60s window), so the conventions are verifiable without a token.'
contact:
name: Immersive Commons
email: admin@immersivecommons.com
url: https://www.immersivecommons.com/developers
license:
name: Proprietary
url: https://www.immersivecommons.com/privacy
servers:
- url: https://www.immersivecommons.com
description: Production
- url: https://www.immersivecommons.com
description: Sandbox (test mode) — same base URL; mint a sandbox token via `sandbox:true` on /api/agent/signup/start. Writes return simulated receipts, reads serve real data.
x-sandbox: token-flag
security:
- {}
tags:
- name: slicing
description: Machine-to-machine hooks for the print-slicing service. Not member-reachable.
paths:
/api/prints/slicing/queue:
get:
operationId: listSlicingQueue
tags:
- slicing
summary: Poll for print requests that have never been sliced
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET bearer, polled roughly every 60s by the slicing service. Returns open requests with an attached file and no prior slice attempt; link-only submissions are never auto-sliced. It deliberately does NOT apply the format/material/quantity eligibility gate - that rule lives once, in the slicing service, so this route answers only 'what is new' and the poller decides 'is it eligible'. `blob_url` is included here, and only here, because this route is machine-to-machine and never client-facing.
security:
- sliceServiceSecret: []
responses:
'200':
description: Unattempted jobs.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/SliceQueueResponse'
'401':
description: Wrong or missing service secret.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'503':
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET is not configured.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
x-ic-route:
file: app/api/prints/slicing/queue/route.ts
method: GET
/api/prints/slicing/result:
post:
operationId: reportSlicingResult
tags:
- slicing
summary: Report one slice outcome
description: 'SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET bearer, called once per job with `ready`, `failed`, or `manual`. Idempotent from the caller''s side - a duplicate POST just overwrites the same fields, which is harmless because these are not a lifecycle transition. The mass fields are validated hard: `filament_g: 0` is REJECTED outright, because zero grams is a broken slicer resolution and never a measurement, and accepting it would put a $0.00 material line on a quote with the provenance of a real slice. `gcode_file_id` is optional - a member''s own pre-sliced upload reports `ready` with no file payload.'
security:
- sliceServiceSecret: []
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/SliceResultRequest'
responses:
'200':
description: The stored slice status.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/SliceResultResponse'
'400':
description: Invalid body, unknown status, or a report that fails the mass validation.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'401':
description: Wrong or missing service secret.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'404':
description: No such print request.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'503':
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET is not configured.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
x-ic-route:
file: app/api/prints/slicing/result/route.ts
method: POST
/api/prints/slicing/gcode-chunk:
post:
operationId: uploadGcodeChunk
tags:
- slicing
summary: Upload one chunk of a sliced G-code
description: 'SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET bearer. The chunked transport exists because base64-in-JSON died at the platform''s ~4.5MB body cap for real parts. Idempotent per (request_id, seq): a replayed chunk does not double-count. `complete` turns true once every seq has landed, which is the signal to call gcode-commit.'
security:
- sliceServiceSecret: []
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/GcodeChunkRequest'
responses:
'200':
description: How many chunks have landed so far.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/GcodeChunkResponse'
'400':
description: Invalid JSON, missing request_id, or a chunk that fails validation.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'401':
description: Wrong or missing service secret.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'413':
description: Chunk or declared total over the ceiling.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'503':
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET is not configured.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
x-ic-route:
file: app/api/prints/slicing/gcode-chunk/route.ts
method: POST
/api/prints/slicing/gcode-commit:
post:
operationId: commitGcodeUpload
tags:
- slicing
summary: Reassemble the uploaded chunks into one vault file
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET bearer. Reassembles server-side in seq order, writes the whole object to the vault, cleans up the temp parts, and returns the `file_id` that the result route links as the job's G-code.
security:
- sliceServiceSecret: []
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/GcodeCommitRequest'
responses:
'200':
description: The committed vault file.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/GcodeCommitResponse'
'400':
description: Invalid JSON, missing request_id, or chunks still missing.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'401':
description: Wrong or missing service secret.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'404':
description: No upload session for that request_id.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
'503':
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET is not configured.
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/Error'
x-ic-route:
file: app/api/prints/slicing/gcode-commit/route.ts
method: POST
components:
schemas:
GcodeChunkResponse:
type: object
required:
- ok
- received
- total
- complete
properties:
ok:
type: boolean
received:
type: integer
description: Distinct chunks landed so far.
total:
type: integer
complete:
type: boolean
description: true is the signal to call gcode-commit.
GcodeChunkRequest:
type: object
required:
- request_id
- seq
- total_chunks
- total_size
- chunk_b64
properties:
request_id:
type: string
seq:
type: integer
description: 0-based. Idempotent per (request_id, seq) — a replay does not double-count.
total_chunks:
type: integer
total_size:
type: integer
description: Bytes of the whole reassembled G-code.
chunk_b64:
type: string
description: ~3MB of base64 per chunk.
SliceResultResponse:
type: object
required:
- ok
- request_id
- slice_status
properties:
ok:
type: boolean
request_id:
type: string
slice_status:
type: string
GcodeCommitResponse:
type: object
required:
- ok
- file
properties:
ok:
type: boolean
file:
type: object
required:
- file_id
description: The committed vault object. Pass `file_id` to the result route as `gcode_file_id`.
properties:
file_id:
type: string
filename:
type: string
size:
type: integer
SliceQueueResponse:
type: object
required:
- ok
- count
- jobs
properties:
ok:
type: boolean
count:
type: integer
jobs:
type: array
items:
type: object
required:
- request_id
- material
- quantity
properties:
request_id:
type: string
material:
type: string
quantity:
type: integer
file:
type:
- object
- 'null'
description: '`blob_url` appears here and NOWHERE client-facing — this route is machine-to-machine.'
properties:
filename:
type: string
size:
type: integer
blob_url:
type: string
link_url:
type:
- string
- 'null'
description: Link-only submissions are never auto-sliced.
GcodeCommitRequest:
type: object
required:
- request_id
properties:
request_id:
type: string
Error:
type: object
required:
- error
additionalProperties: true
description: Structured JSON error. `error` (string) is always present — an error code or a human-readable message. `ok:false` is present on bearer auth-gate rejections. Endpoints may attach additional context keys to aid recovery (tier, current_tier, limit, window_seconds, valid_kinds, recovery_hint, detail, example, ...); the reusable ones are named below.
properties:
error:
type: string
description: Error code or human-readable message (always present).
ok:
type: boolean
enum:
- false
description: Present (false) on auth-gate rejections.
error_kind:
type: string
description: Machine-readable failure class (rate_limit, validation, not_found, ...).
message:
type: string
description: Longer human-readable detail (feedback + some rate-limit errors).
rate:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/RateInfo'
retry_after_seconds:
type: integer
description: Seconds to wait before retrying (on 429).
tier:
type: string
description: The caller's current tier — present on a tier/scope authorization (403) rejection.
current_tier:
type: string
description: The caller's current tier — present on a tier/request validation (400) rejection.
detail:
type: string
description: Extra failure detail — present on some 500 responses (e.g. the agent event-log read).
SliceResultRequest:
type: object
required:
- request_id
- slice_status
properties:
request_id:
type: string
slice_status:
type: string
enum:
- ready
- failed
- manual
slice_report:
type: object
description: Required for a `ready` result. `filament_g` of 0 is REJECTED — zero grams is a broken slicer resolution, never a measurement.
properties:
print_time_s:
type: integer
filament_g:
type: number
description: Must be greater than zero.
filament_g_verified:
type: boolean
description: Rejected as true with no mass — that would read downstream as 'confirmed zero material'.
error:
type: string
description: Present on a `failed` result.
gcode_file_id:
type: string
description: Optional. Omitted for a member's own pre-sliced upload, whose file is already in the vault.
RateInfo:
type: object
description: Per-token rate-limit snapshot returned by write endpoints.
properties:
current:
type: integer
remaining:
type: integer
limit:
type: integer
securitySchemes:
agentBearer:
type: http
scheme: bearer
bearerFormat: agt_<base64url>
description: 'Per-member, individually-revocable agent token minted via the device-code flow. Send as `Authorization: Bearer agt_...`. The scope array in each operation''s security requirement names the IC scope the handler enforces.'
clerkSession:
type: apiKey
in: cookie
name: __session
description: Browser Clerk session cookie. Operations under this scheme are reachable ONLY from a signed-in browser session, NOT with an agt_ bearer token. Agents use the equivalent MCP tools (e.g. ic_get_my_membership, ic_request_tier).
workshopCode:
type: http
scheme: bearer
bearerFormat: 6-char enrollment code
description: 'The workshop''s own enrollment code, minted by POST /api/workshop/enroll and presented as a bearer. It is NOT an agt_ token: it carries no scopes, is not revocable per-token, and reaches only the /api/workshop/* routes.'
sliceServiceSecret:
type: http
scheme: bearer
bearerFormat: shared secret
description: SLICE_SERVICE_SECRET — the machine-to-machine bearer the print-slicing service presents. A distinct trust boundary (an external machine on the tailnet), which is why it has its own secret rather than reusing the cron one. No member holds it and no member-facing flow can reach these routes.
floorcastOnboarding:
type: http
scheme: bearer
bearerFormat: fco_<...>
description: 'A single-use Floorcast onboarding token. It exists because tenant provisioning has a chicken-and-egg problem: no operator exists yet for a floor that does not exist yet, so neither a Clerk session nor an agt_ token can authorize the call. Minting one is a concierge step with no live route, and the token is consumed by the provision it authorizes.'
x-payment-info:
protocol: x402
discovery: https://www.immersivecommons.com/discovery/resources
donor_wall: https://www.immersivecommons.com/api/floor10/donations
note: Payable resources are advertised at /discovery/resources; a bare request to a payable resource returns HTTP 402 with the PAYMENT-REQUIRED challenge.
x-api-lifecycle:
versioning: unversioned-root (info.version is a dated CalVer change marker)
deprecation: 'deprecated operations are flagged `deprecated: true` here and kept at least one release; the /api/zai-keys/* aliases (2026-09-15) are the current set'
x-sandbox:
summary: 'A sandbox token (mint by adding "sandbox": true to POST /api/agent/signup/start) is a real token with real scopes whose WRITE operations return a simulated receipt instead of mutating; reads serve real data. Same base URL + bearer auth. Immutable after mint.'
obtain:
endpoint: POST /api/agent/signup/start
body:
sandbox: true
write_response_shape:
ok: true
sandbox: true
simulated: true
would_have:
action: string
scope: string
args: object
note: string — scope was checked; deeper business rules (tier/role/ownership/signature) are NOT evaluated in sandbox, and no production state changed. A green receipt means well-formed + scoped, NOT guaranteed to pass in production.
real_exceptions:
- POST /api/agent/feedback (bug-report channel must be heard)
- POST /api/agent/token/revoke (token lifecycle; genuinely revokes)
not_sandbox_eligible:
- ic_donate (x402 payment rail — never faked; not a REST operation in this spec)
- floor-admin toggles + tools with no concrete scope to check — denied fail-closed, never silently simulated