invinoveritas Admission Chain API

The Admission Chain API from invinoveritas — 3 operation(s) for admission chain.

GitHub OpenAPI

Operations 3

GET /admission-chain/inclusion/{receipt_hash} Inclusion #
GET /admission-chain/terminal/{receipt_hash} Terminal #
POST /admission-chain/slot Authorize Slot Route #

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OpenAPI Specification

babyblueviper-com-admission-chain-api-openapi.yml Raw ↑
openapi: 3.2.0
info:
  title: invinoveritas Admission Chain API
  description: 'The **verification layer for autonomous agents** — a neutral verdict before an irreversible action (`/review`), a signed proof after (`/prove`), and a public, on-chain-verifiable track record (`/ledger`) you can audit without trusting us. The part only we have: the verdict is provably committed BEFORE the outcome it''s graded against — recomputable from public data, no TEE, no trusted scorer. Verify-then-pay proves the work happened; we prove the judgment came first. We also run the open conformance registry where agent verifiers are graded against the same recomputable bar — ours included, no green by assertion. Competitors conform to and certify against our suite, across more than one anchoring mechanism; we report our own gaps in the open. Model-agnostic by construction: we verify the output, not the model that produced it. As inference commoditizes and agents route to the cheapest interchangeable model, output-quality variance — not capability — becomes the risk on an irreversible action, and the one thing an agent cannot self-serve is a verdict on its own correctness. This matters most exactly where it''s least obvious: a local or open-weight model has no vendor safety layer, no ToS enforcement, no accountable party upstream — the independent check matters MORE, not less, the further a model runs from a hosted, policed provider. Route to any model, local or hosted; verify before you act. Dogfooded on our own important decisions. A reasoning / structured-decision / agent-memory / sandboxed-execution / Lightning-native-marketplace stack runs underneath as supporting infrastructure. Pay-per-use via Lightning Network — Bearer Token (recommended) or L402, plus x402 (USDC on Base) or card. Free registration (api_key); top-up and withdrawal flows; agent-to-agent coordination primitives; agent Lightning addresses (agent_id@api.babyblueviper.com); BearerProvider for LangChain.'
  contact:
    name: invinoveritas
    url: https://invinoveritas.dev/
    email: contact@invinoveritas.dev
  license:
    name: Apache 2.0
    url: https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html
  version: 1.13.0
  x-guidance: 'invinoveritas — the VERIFICATION LAYER for autonomous agents: a neutral verdict before an irreversible action, a signed proof after, and a public, on-chain-verifiable track record of those verdicts you can audit without trusting us — the oversight + judgment the agent can''t self-issue. Pay-per-call services settled in USDC via x402 on Base (also Lightning/L402 or a funded Bearer balance). Paid resources carry x-payment-info and answer an unauthenticated probe with a 402 challenge; send the JSON body in the operation schema, then retry with the X-PAYMENT header. Good entry points: POST /review (capital-scale-aware verdict before an agent ships an irreversible action), POST /prove (signed, independently-verifiable attestation of a prior execution), GET /ledger (the public signed verdict track record). Routes marked security:[] are free or Bearer/identity-gated and are not x402 resources.'
tags:
- name: Admission Chain
paths:
  /admission-chain/inclusion/{receipt_hash}:
    get:
      summary: Inclusion
      operationId: inclusion_admission_chain_inclusion__receipt_hash__get
      parameters:
      - name: receipt_hash
        in: path
        required: true
        schema:
          type: string
          title: Receipt Hash
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Successful Response
          content:
            application/json:
              schema: {}
        '422':
          description: Validation Error
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
      security: []
      tags:
      - Admission Chain
  /admission-chain/terminal/{receipt_hash}:
    get:
      summary: Terminal
      description: '2026-10-05 (admission-chain v2 step 1): the ONE terminal record for the admission with this receipt_hash

        (RESULT / NO_RESULT / UNRESOLVED, output_hash, observed_scope), its place in the terminal hash chain, and the

        Merkle path + .ots proof of its checkpoint. Same privacy rule as /inclusion: looked up only by the receipt_hash

        the requester holds; served only when the terminal is alone in its checkpoint.'
      operationId: terminal_admission_chain_terminal__receipt_hash__get
      parameters:
      - name: receipt_hash
        in: path
        required: true
        schema:
          type: string
          title: Receipt Hash
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Successful Response
          content:
            application/json:
              schema: {}
        '422':
          description: Validation Error
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/HTTPValidationError'
      security: []
      tags:
      - Admission Chain
  /admission-chain/slot:
    post:
      summary: Authorize Slot Route
      description: '2026-10-05 (admission-chain v2 item 1; formulary-systems/spec#5 section 3, C16/C18/C20): preauthorize ONE logical

        LLM-judge run slot BEFORE any execution. Body: {manifest_hash, dispute_id, requirement_id, judge_id, run_index,

        max_attempts (1..16, default 1), retry_on (["NO_RESULT"] required when max_attempts > 1 -- the committed retry condition,

        mirroring the manifest''s; UNRESOLVED can never be one: it consumes the run, spec section 7), dispute_namespace_ref (optional,

        e.g. an ERC-792 arbitrator/dispute reference)}. Slot rows, slot claims and their terminals are checkpointed ALONE (single-leaf

        Merkle checkpoints, OTS-anchored), so their inclusion proofs are always served (C16 ordering establishable for every

        authority-eligible execution).

        Bearer api key required: only that key can later claim the slot via /review {slot: {run_id, attempt_index}}.

        Free: no review runs here. Returns run_id = H(manifest_hash, dispute_id, requirement_id, judge_id, run_index)

        and the slot row''s receipt_hash in the admission chain (Merkle-checkpointed, OTS-anchored like every receipt).


        Honest boundary: this proves the slot was committed in OUR chain before any claim on it (a claim''s receipt_hash

        commits to this receipt_hash) and that each attempt is claimed at most once. It does not prove the authority of

        the dispute itself -- that stays with the dispute namespace (e.g. the arbitrator contract) named in

        dispute_namespace_ref.'
      operationId: authorize_slot_route_admission_chain_slot_post
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Successful Response
          content:
            application/json:
              schema: {}
      security: []
      tags:
      - Admission Chain
components:
  schemas:
    ValidationError:
      properties:
        loc:
          items:
            anyOf:
            - type: string
            - type: integer
          type: array
          title: Location
        msg:
          type: string
          title: Message
        type:
          type: string
          title: Error Type
        input:
          title: Input
        ctx:
          type: object
          title: Context
      type: object
      required:
      - loc
      - msg
      - type
      title: ValidationError
    HTTPValidationError:
      properties:
        detail:
          items:
            $ref: '#/components/schemas/ValidationError'
          type: array
          title: Detail
      type: object
      title: HTTPValidationError
x-provenance:
  method: harvested
  publisher: invinoveritas
  source: https://api.babyblueviper.com/openapi.json
  note: split by refine-openapis from the provider's own published document, verified by fetch (openapi/_original/*.fetch.json);
    stamped by stamp-openapi-provenance.py (roadmap#793)