AxonFlow Audit Verification API

openapi: 3.2.0
info:
  title: Axonflow Audit Verification API
  version: 11.1.0
  contact:
    name: AxonFlow Support
    url: https://getaxonflow.com/support
  license:
    name: Business Source License 1.1
    url: https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow/blob/main/LICENSE
  description: 'Operations tagged Audit Verification across 2 of this provider''s published API definitions: axonflow-agent-api.yaml, axonflow-agent-openapi.yml. Each path carries the servers of the definition it was published in.'
servers:
- url: https://agent.getaxonflow.com
  description: Production (SaaS)
- url: https://axonflow.example.com
  description: Self-hosted deployment (agent single entry point, ADR-024)
- url: http://localhost:8080
  description: Local Development
tags:
- name: Audit Verification
  description: Non-repudiation verification of the signed decision chain (#2722).
paths:
  /api/v1/audit/chains/{chainID}/verify:
    get:
      tags:
      - Audit Verification
      summary: Verify a decision chain
      description: 'Re-verifies an entire decision chain: the `prev_hash` linkage across all

        of its records (ordering / completeness) and every per-record Ed25519

        signature (authorship). Read-only; never mutates the chain.


        The chain is resolved by id **only within the authenticated caller''s

        organization** (RLS-scoped); the org is taken from the request

        credentials, never from a path or query parameter. `chainID` is the

        decision id (a UUID).


        Inspect `authorship_proven` for the strong non-repudiation claim (every

        record signed and all signatures + linkage verify). `valid` only means

        no integrity violation was detected and can be `true` for a chain with

        zero signed records, so do not gate non-repudiation on `valid` alone.


        **Authority (#2914).** Authentication alone is not enough: this route

        requires COMPLIANCE READ AUTHORITY over the organization. Present a

        validated per-user token (`X-User-Token`, or `Authorization: Bearer`)

        whose role is `admin`, `owner` or `policy_admin`, or call from an

        internal service asserting `X-Axonflow-Admin-Authority: true`. A

        Community-mode deployment is exempt: it has no authentication and

        resolves every caller to one local operator. Anything else is `403`.


        **Community SaaS (`try.getaxonflow.com`) refuses these routes, by

        design.** The hosted evaluation stack runs with authentication enabled,

        so the Community-mode exemption above does not apply to it, and its

        evaluator accounts hold no entitled role. Verification there is a `403`.

        Granting evaluators access would widen, on a public shared stack, the

        exact exposure this change closes. Verify audit records on a deployment

        you operate.'
      operationId: verifyAuditChain
      parameters:
      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/LicenseKey'
      - name: chainID
        in: path
        required: true
        description: Decision chain id (the decision UUID)
        schema:
          type: string
          format: uuid
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Verification result (the chain exists in your organization)
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/ChainVerificationResult'
        '400':
          description: chainID is not a valid UUID
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '401':
          description: Missing authenticated org context
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '403':
          description: 'Authenticated, but without compliance read authority over this

            organization (#2914). See the authority note in the description.

            '
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '404':
          description: No decision chain found for this id in your organization
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '500':
          description: Verification failed (internal error)
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
    servers:
    - url: https://agent.getaxonflow.com
      description: Production (SaaS)
    - url: https://axonflow.example.com
      description: Self-hosted deployment (agent single entry point, ADR-024)
    - url: http://localhost:8080
      description: Local Development
  /api/v1/audit/records/{recordID}/verify:
    get:
      tags:
      - Audit Verification
      summary: Verify a single decision record
      description: 'Verifies ONE decision record standalone, proving its authorship from the

        record alone without walking the rest of the chain. Read-only.


        The response republishes the recomputed verification material so the

        result is independently checkable offline: `digest_preimage_b64` is the

        exact byte string that SHA-256-hashes to `record_digest`; an auditor can

        base64-decode it, hash it, confirm it equals `record_digest`, rebuild it

        from the raw record fields, and then run

        `ed25519.Verify(public_key, []byte(chain_hash), base64decode(record_signature))`,

        trusting neither this endpoint nor its digest.


        The record is resolved by id only within the authenticated caller''s

        organization (RLS-scoped). `recordID` is the per-record UUID assigned at

        signing time (distinct from the chain id).


        **Authority (#2914).** Authentication alone is not enough: this route

        requires COMPLIANCE READ AUTHORITY over the organization. Present a

        validated per-user token (`X-User-Token`, or `Authorization: Bearer`)

        whose role is `admin`, `owner` or `policy_admin`, or call from an

        internal service asserting `X-Axonflow-Admin-Authority: true`. A

        Community-mode deployment is exempt: it has no authentication and

        resolves every caller to one local operator. Anything else is `403`.


        **Community SaaS (`try.getaxonflow.com`) refuses these routes, by

        design.** The hosted evaluation stack runs with authentication enabled,

        so the Community-mode exemption above does not apply to it, and its

        evaluator accounts hold no entitled role. Verification there is a `403`.

        Granting evaluators access would widen, on a public shared stack, the

        exact exposure this change closes. Verify audit records on a deployment

        you operate.'
      operationId: verifyAuditRecord
      parameters:
      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/LicenseKey'
      - name: recordID
        in: path
        required: true
        description: Decision record id (the per-record UUID)
        schema:
          type: string
          format: uuid
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Verification result (the record exists in your organization)
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/RecordVerificationResult'
        '400':
          description: recordID is not a valid UUID
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '401':
          description: Missing authenticated org context
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '403':
          description: 'Authenticated, but without compliance read authority over this

            organization (#2914). See the authority note in the description.

            '
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '404':
          description: No decision record found for this id in your organization
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '500':
          description: Verification failed (internal error)
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
    servers:
    - url: https://agent.getaxonflow.com
      description: Production (SaaS)
    - url: https://axonflow.example.com
      description: Self-hosted deployment (agent single entry point, ADR-024)
    - url: http://localhost:8080
      description: Local Development
  /api/v1/audit/signing-key:
    get:
      tags:
      - Audit Verification
      summary: Publish the current public signing key
      description: 'Returns the current public Ed25519 verification key so an external

        auditor can re-verify any record''s signature offline. Read-only.


        When no signing key is configured, `configured` is `false` and

        `public_key` is empty: records are hash-chained but unsigned, and the

        verify endpoints report that honestly.


        **Authority (#2914).** Authentication alone is not enough: this route

        requires COMPLIANCE READ AUTHORITY over the organization. Present a

        validated per-user token (`X-User-Token`, or `Authorization: Bearer`)

        whose role is `admin`, `owner` or `policy_admin`, or call from an

        internal service asserting `X-Axonflow-Admin-Authority: true`. A

        Community-mode deployment is exempt: it has no authentication and

        resolves every caller to one local operator. Anything else is `403`.


        **Community SaaS (`try.getaxonflow.com`) refuses these routes, by

        design.** The hosted evaluation stack runs with authentication enabled,

        so the Community-mode exemption above does not apply to it, and its

        evaluator accounts hold no entitled role. Verification there is a `403`.

        Granting evaluators access would widen, on a public shared stack, the

        exact exposure this change closes. Verify audit records on a deployment

        you operate.'
      operationId: getAuditSigningKey
      parameters:
      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/LicenseKey'
      responses:
        '200':
          description: Current public signing key (or that none is configured)
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditSigningKeyResponse'
        '401':
          description: Missing authenticated org context
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
        '403':
          description: 'Authenticated, but without compliance read authority over this

            organization (#2914). See the authority note in the description.

            '
          content:
            application/json:
              schema:
                $ref: '#/components/schemas/AuditVerifyError'
    servers:
    - url: https://agent.getaxonflow.com
      description: Production (SaaS)
    - url: https://axonflow.example.com
      description: Self-hosted deployment (agent single entry point, ADR-024)
    - url: http://localhost:8080
      description: Local Development
components:
  schemas:
    AuditVerifyError:
      type: object
      description: Error envelope returned by the audit-verification endpoints.
      properties:
        error:
          type: string
          description: Human-readable error message.
      required:
      - error
    ChainVerificationResult:
      type: object
      description: 'Outcome of verifying an entire decision chain''s prev_hash linkage and

        every per-record Ed25519 signature.

        '
      properties:
        chain_id:
          type: string
          format: uuid
        org_id:
          type: string
        total_records:
          type: integer
        valid:
          type: boolean
          description: 'True when no integrity violation was detected (linkage holds and

            every signature that exists verifies). Can be true for a chain with

            zero signed records. Use `authorship_proven` for the strong claim.

            '
        authorship_proven:
          type: boolean
          description: 'True only when every record is signed AND all signatures + linkage

            verify. Gate non-repudiation on this flag.

            '
        linkage_valid:
          type: boolean
        signatures_valid:
          type: boolean
        signed_records:
          type: integer
        unsigned_records:
          type: integer
        first_broken_seq:
          type: integer
          format: int64
          description: Sequence of the first detected break (omitted when valid).
        first_broken_record_id:
          type: string
          description: Record id of the first detected break (omitted when valid).
        break_reason:
          type: string
          description: Why the chain broke (omitted when valid).
        signing_key_id:
          type: string
          description: Identifier of the tracker's current signing key.
        public_key:
          type: string
          description: Base64 Ed25519 public key for offline re-verification.
        verified_at:
          type: string
          format: date-time
      required:
      - chain_id
      - org_id
      - total_records
      - valid
      - authorship_proven
      - linkage_valid
      - signatures_valid
      - verified_at
    AuditSigningKeyResponse:
      type: object
      description: The current public Ed25519 verification key (or that none is configured).
      properties:
        algorithm:
          type: string
          example: ed25519
        signing_key_id:
          type: string
          description: Identifier of the current signing key (empty when none configured).
        public_key:
          type: string
          description: Base64 Ed25519 public key (empty when none configured).
        configured:
          type: boolean
          description: False when no signing key is configured (records are hash-chained but unsigned).
        verification_note:
          type: string
          description: How to verify a record offline with this key.
      required:
      - algorithm
      - configured
    RecordVerificationResult:
      type: object
      description: 'Outcome of verifying a SINGLE decision record standalone. Republishes the

        recomputed material so the result is independently checkable offline.

        '
      properties:
        record_id:
          type: string
          format: uuid
        chain_id:
          type: string
          format: uuid
        org_id:
          type: string
        chain_seq:
          type: integer
          format: int64
        signed:
          type: boolean
        signature_valid:
          type: boolean
        valid:
          type: boolean
        reason:
          type: string
          description: Explanation when the record does not verify (omitted when valid).
        digest_preimage_b64:
          type: string
          description: 'Base64 of the exact byte string that SHA-256-hashes to

            `record_digest`. Decode, hash, and confirm it equals `record_digest`,

            then rebuild it from the raw record fields to verify independently.

            '
        record_digest:
          type: string
          description: SHA-256 hex of the record pre-image.
        prev_hash:
          type: string
          description: Hash of the previous record in the chain.
        chain_hash:
          type: string
          description: 'sha256_hex(record_digest + "|" + prev_hash); the message that the

            Ed25519 signature is computed over.

            '
        record_signature:
          type: string
          description: Base64 Ed25519 signature over `chain_hash` (omitted when unsigned).
        signing_key_id:
          type: string
        public_key:
          type: string
          description: Base64 Ed25519 public key for offline re-verification.
        verified_at:
          type: string
          format: date-time
      required:
      - record_id
      - chain_id
      - org_id
      - chain_seq
      - signed
      - signature_valid
      - valid
      - digest_preimage_b64
      - record_digest
      - prev_hash
      - chain_hash
      - verified_at
  parameters:
    LicenseKey:
      name: Authorization
      in: header
      required: true
      description: 'OAuth2-style Basic authentication header.

        Format: `Basic base64(clientId:clientSecret)`


        - `clientId`: Your organization identifier (required)

        - `clientSecret`: Authentication credential (optional for community mode)


        Not required when `DEPLOYMENT_MODE=community`.

        '
      schema:
        type: string
        example: Basic bXktb3JnOkFYT04tVjIteHh4
  securitySchemes:
    BasicAuth:
      type: http
      scheme: basic
      description: "OAuth2-style Basic authentication using `clientId:clientSecret` credentials.\n\n**Header format:** `Authorization: Basic base64(clientId:clientSecret)`\n\n- `clientId` (required): Your organization/client identifier\n- `clientSecret` (optional): Authentication credential. Optional for community/self-hosted mode.\n\n**Example:**\n```bash\n# With clientSecret (enterprise)\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n 'my-org:AXON-V2-xxx' | base64)\" ...\n\n# Without clientSecret (community mode)\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Basic $(echo -n 'my-org:' | base64)\" ...\n```\n\n## Per-user identity behind a shared credential\n\nThis credential authenticates an ORGANIZATION or client, not a person.\nBehind one such credential can sit many human principals, each\noptionally forwarding a **per-user token** that proves who they are.\nWhere that token is read depends on the envelope: the `user_token`\nfield of the request body on `POST /api/v1/decide` and the four MCP\nREST routes, and the `X-User-Token` header on the MCP-server JSON-RPC\nplane. The two spellings are deliberately not interchangeable.\n\n**A presented per-user token that fails to validate is a refused\naccess attempt, not a legacy caller** (`401`, audited\n`user_token_rejected`). It is never downgraded to a shared service\nidentity, so revocation, expiry, algorithm pinning and signature\nchecks take effect on every plane that reads one.\n\n**Whether presenting a token is REQUIRED is a per-organization\nposture, `require_user_token`, and it is off by default (#3476).**\nWith it off, an enterprise caller that presents no token at all is\nserved under a synthetic org-scoped service identity\n(`<client-id>@axonflow.local`, role `service`), which is the correct\nanswer for an infrastructure gateway acting as a Policy Enforcement\nPoint with no end-user token to forward. With it on, that caller is\nrefused at AUTHENTICATION, before any policy is evaluated (`401`,\naudited `user_token_required`).\n\nThe posture exists because a policy that names a PERSON - a\nprincipal-scoped constraint or permission in the organization's typed\ndocument (PRD v11 §1.6) - is only meaningful if a caller cannot CHOOSE\nto arrive without an identity: with the posture off such a policy\nstill applies to everyone who presents a token, but a caller can\ndecline to present one and be decided as the credential\n(`subject_type=Client`). Governance segments (ADR-060) decide on no\nagent route since v11.0.0 (#4253). Two levers set it, and an explicit\nper-organization row wins over the deployment-wide default in EITHER\ndirection:\n\n- `organizations.require_user_token`, per organization, default\n  `false`.\n- `AXONFLOW_REQUIRE_USER_TOKEN`, deployment-wide, default `false`.\n\nA posture change takes up to one cache window to become live\n(`AXONFLOW_REQUIRE_USER_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS`, default 60 seconds,\nclamped to `[5, 600]`). A posture that cannot be READ resolves to\nREQUIRED rather than not-required, so a database outage cannot\nquietly switch the control off; a genuinely absent organization row\nis not a read failure and falls through to the deployment default.\n\n`POST /v1/chat/completions` is outside this guarantee: it mirrors\nOpenAI's wire shape and carries no per-user token field at all, so it\nkeeps the synthetic-identity fallback regardless of the posture.\nCommunity and community-SaaS deployments never reach any of the above.\n"
    InternalServiceID:
      type: apiKey
      in: header
      name: X-Internal-Service-ID
      description: 'Internal-service (operator lane) credential — **part one of two**.

        Must be sent together with `X-Internal-Service-Token`; either header

        alone is not a credential.


        This is the HMAC identity the Orchestrator and the Enterprise

        customer-portal use to call agent endpoints without holding a

        customer license. `apiAuthMiddleware` lifts both headers (plus an

        optional `X-Tenant-ID` scope) into `AuthHints`

        (`internalServiceHints` in `platform/agent/auth.go`) and

        `Authenticate()` validates them before any mode-specific auth

        (`platform/agent/authenticator.go:120-155`).


        Value: the service id, `orchestrator-internal`.


        ⚠️ An invalid or expired token is **not** an error by itself — it

        falls through to the deployment''s normal auth

        (`platform/agent/authenticator.go:153-154`). Send the internal-service

        headers on their own: paired with an `Authorization: Basic` header, a

        stale token silently yields a *tenant*-scoped answer that looks like a

        successful operator call.

        '
    InternalServiceToken:
      type: apiKey
      in: header
      name: X-Internal-Service-Token
      description: 'Internal-service (operator lane) credential — **part two of two**.

        Must be sent together with `X-Internal-Service-ID`.


        Format: `AXON-INTERNAL-{unix_ts}-{sig}`, where `sig` is the first 16

        hex characters of HMAC-SHA256 over `orchestrator-internal:{unix_ts}`

        keyed with `AXONFLOW_INTERNAL_SERVICE_SECRET`. Validated by

        `platform/shared/serviceauth` within a 5-minute clock-skew window, so

        it must be re-minted per session. See

        `technical-docs/runbooks/RUNBOOK_CONNECTOR_CONFIGURATION.md` for the

        exact minting snippet.

        '
x-refined-from:
- axonflow-agent-api.yaml
- axonflow-agent-openapi.yml