National University of Singapore · Agentic Access

National University of Singapore Agentic Access

x-agentic-access derived

National University of Singapore exposes 8 API operations that an AI agent could call, of which 0 are state-changing ‘acting’ operations. This is a recommended x-agentic-access execution contract — the scope, audience, consequence tier, short-lived token constraints, and escalation each action should carry before it is handed to an autonomous agent.

By consequence: 5 read and 3 write.

3 operations are classed safety-critical and should require human-in-the-loop approval at runtime.

Contracts are classified heuristically from the provider’s OpenAPI and refresh on every APIs.io network build; audience is bound per deployment. The model follows Curity’s Access Intelligence (apidays Munich 2026). Browse every provider’s agent contracts at agentic-access.apis.io.

UniversityHigher EducationEducationSingaporeResearchIdentity FederationResearch RepositoryCourse CatalogOpen AccessLearning Management
Operations: 8 Acting: 0 Human-in-the-loop: 3 Method: derived

By consequence

read 5 write 3

Source

Agentic Access

Raw ↑ 
generated: '2026-08-19'
method: derived
source: openapi/nus-identity-openapi.yml
x-operator: institution
description: >-
  Recommended x-agentic-access execution contracts for the one institution-operated National
  University of Singapore API surface, classified from the contract in openapi/. This replaces
  an earlier version of this file that was derived from the NUSMods API — a student
  organisation's contract, not NUS's — and therefore credited NUS with someone else's
  engineering. A governance starting point; review and bind audience per deployment.
  See research/curity/agentic-governance/.
summary:
  operations: 8
  by_action_class:
    connected: 5
    privileged: 3
  by_consequence:
    read: 5
    write: 3
  human_in_the_loop_required: 3
caveat: >-
  This is an identity provider. Every write-consequence operation here mints or terminates
  credentials for a real person at a real university. No agent should hold a client_secret for
  this provider without an explicit, auditable institutional grant from NUS Information
  Technology, and NUS operates no self-service path to obtain one.
operations:
- path: /adfs/.well-known/openid-configuration
  method: get
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: connected
    consequence: read
    subject: none
    token: null
    audit: none
    notes: Public discovery document. Safe for an agent to poll; it is the only change signal NUS emits.
- path: /adfs/discovery/keys
  method: get
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: connected
    consequence: read
    subject: none
    token: null
    audit: none
    notes: Public signing keys. Cache and honour rotation.
- path: /FederationMetadata/2007-06/FederationMetadata.xml
  method: get
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: connected
    consequence: read
    subject: none
    token: null
    audit: none
    notes: Public signed SAML metadata. Verify the signature before trusting it.
- path: /adfs/oauth2/authorize/
  method: get
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: privileged
    consequence: write
    subject: required
    human-in-the-loop: required
    token:
      max-ttl: 300
    audit: full
    notes: >-
      Initiates interactive authentication of a real person. An agent must never drive this
      without the human present; that is the entire point of the endpoint.
- path: /adfs/oauth2/token/
  method: post
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: privileged
    consequence: write
    subject: required
    human-in-the-loop: required
    token:
      max-ttl: 3600
    audit: full
    notes: >-
      Mints access, refresh and ID tokens. The provider advertises the password and implicit
      grants; an agent must use neither. Refresh tokens issued here should be treated as
      credentials of the person, not of the agent.
- path: /adfs/oauth2/devicecode
  method: post
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: privileged
    consequence: write
    subject: required
    human-in-the-loop: required
    token:
      max-ttl: 900
    audit: full
    notes: Device authorization grant; requires a human to complete verification out of band.
- path: /adfs/userinfo
  method: get
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: connected
    consequence: read
    subject: required
    token:
      max-ttl: 3600
    audit: full
    notes: >-
      Returns claims about an identified student or staff member. Personal data under
      Singapore's PDPA; minimise, do not retain, and do not use `sub` as a durable key — it is
      pairwise and will differ per client.
- path: /adfs/oauth2/logout
  method: get
  x-agentic-access:
    action-class: connected
    consequence: read
    subject: optional
    token: null
    audit: full
    notes: Terminates the user's session. Idempotent and safe, but log it.