Hyperice · Agentic Access

Hyperice Agentic Access

x-agentic-access generated

Hyperice exposes 21 API operations that an AI agent could call, of which 13 are state-changing ‘acting’ operations. This is a recommended x-agentic-access execution contract — the scope, audience, consequence tier, short-lived token constraints, and escalation each action should carry before it is handed to an autonomous agent.

By consequence: 8 read, 10 write, and 3 physical.

Contracts are classified heuristically from the provider’s OpenAPI and refresh on every APIs.io network build; audience is bound per deployment. The model follows Curity’s Access Intelligence (apidays Munich 2026). Browse every provider’s agent contracts at agentic-access.apis.io.

CompanyCommerceRetailHealth and WellnessConsumer HardwareSports and FitnessAgentic CommerceGraphQLMCPShopify
Operations: 21 Acting: 13 Human-in-the-loop: 0 Method: generated

By consequence

read 8 write 10 physical 3

Source

Agentic Access

Raw ↑ 
generated: '2026-07-31'
method: generated
source:
- mcp/hyperice-mcp.yml
- openapi/hyperice-storefront-openapi.yml
- graphql/hyperice-storefront.graphql
- https://hyperice.com/llms.txt
description: >-
  Recommended x-agentic-access execution contracts for every operation an agent
  can reach on Hyperice's perimeter, classified with the Curity Access
  Intelligence model. This is a governance STARTING POINT authored by API
  Evangelist, not a Hyperice claim — with one exception: the human-in-the-loop
  requirement on complete_checkout is Hyperice's own published rule, quoted
  below, not our recommendation.
provider_published_rules:
- rule: human-in-the-loop on payment
  quote: >-
    "Checkout requires human approval. Agents must not complete payment without
    explicit buyer consent. If you cannot get contemporaneous buyer approval at
    the moment of payment, install https://shop.app/SKILL.md and route the
    purchase through Shop Pay instead."
  source: https://hyperice.com/llms.txt
- rule: backoff
  quote: 'Respect rate limits. The MCP endpoint is rate-limited per IP. Back off on 429 responses.'
  source: https://hyperice.com/llms.txt
- rule: buyer context
  quote: 'Use buyer context. Pass context.address_country and context.currency for accurate pricing and availability.'
  source: https://hyperice.com/llms.txt
- rule: agent identity
  quote: >-
    The MCP endpoint refuses to enumerate or invoke tools without a resolvable
    UCP agent profile URI (observed HTTP 422 invalid_profile_url).
  source: https://hyperice.com/api/ucp/mcp
summary:
  operations: 21
  by_action_class: {connected: 8, acting: 13}
  by_consequence: {read: 8, write: 10, physical: 3}
  human_in_the_loop: 1
  audit_required: 13
  audience: null
  note: >-
    audience is deliberately left null on every entry — it binds per deployment,
    not per provider.
operations:
- id: listProducts
  surface: rest
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'catalog:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: none}
  audit: optional
- id: getProduct
  surface: rest
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'catalog:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: none}
  audit: optional
- id: listCollections
  surface: rest
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'catalog:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: none}
  audit: optional
- id: listCollectionProducts
  surface: rest
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'catalog:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: none}
  audit: optional
- id: getUcpProfile
  surface: rest
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'discovery:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: none}
  audit: optional
- id: getLlmsTxt
  surface: rest
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'discovery:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: none}
  audit: optional
- id: search_catalog
  surface: mcp
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'catalog:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  audit: optional
- id: lookup_catalog
  surface: mcp
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'catalog:read'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 3600, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  audit: optional
- id: create_cart
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'cart:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  idempotency: "meta['idempotency-key']"
  audit: required
- id: update_cart
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'cart:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  idempotency: "meta['idempotency-key']"
  audit: required
- id: cancel_cart
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'cart:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  idempotency: "meta['idempotency-key']"
  audit: required
- id: create_checkout
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'checkout:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  idempotency: "meta['idempotency-key']"
  audit: required
- id: update_checkout
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'checkout:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  idempotency: "meta['idempotency-key']"
  audit: required
  note: Writes the buyer's physical shipping address — treat the payload as PII.
- id: cancel_checkout
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'checkout:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: ucp-agent-profile}
  audit: required
- id: complete_checkout
  surface: mcp
  action_class: acting
  consequence: physical
  scope: 'checkout:complete'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 300, type: ucp-agent-profile, exchange: required, purpose_required: true}
  idempotency: "meta['idempotency-key']"
  human_in_the_loop: required
  audit: required
  rationale: >-
    Charges a real payment instrument and dispatches a physical shipment.
    Irreversible by the agent. Hyperice itself mandates explicit buyer consent
    at the moment of payment.
- id: get_order
  surface: mcp
  action_class: connected
  consequence: read
  scope: 'customer-account-mcp-api:full'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: oidc-bearer}
  audit: required
  note: >-
    Reads buyer-owned order data. Classified read, but the only scope Hyperice
    offers is a :full grant, so least privilege is not achievable here.
- id: cartSubmitForCompletion
  surface: graphql
  action_class: acting
  consequence: physical
  scope: 'checkout:complete'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 300, type: none, exchange: required, purpose_required: true}
  human_in_the_loop: required
  audit: required
  rationale: The GraphQL equivalent of complete_checkout. Places a real order.
- id: shopPayPaymentRequestSessionSubmit
  surface: graphql
  action_class: acting
  consequence: physical
  scope: 'payment:submit'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 300, type: session-token, exchange: required, purpose_required: true}
  idempotency: 'idempotencyKey (String!, required)'
  human_in_the_loop: required
  audit: required
  rationale: Submits a Shop Pay payment transaction. The only GraphQL mutation with mandatory idempotency.
- id: customerCreate
  surface: graphql
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'customer:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: none}
  audit: required
  note: Creates a real customer record from agent-supplied PII. No CAPTCHA or agent gate observed.
- id: customerUpdate
  surface: graphql
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'customer:write'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: customer-access-token}
  audit: required
- id: customerAccessTokenCreate
  surface: graphql
  action_class: acting
  consequence: write
  scope: 'customer:authenticate'
  token: {ttl_max_seconds: 900, type: none}
  audit: required
  note: >-
    Exchanges buyer email+password for a customer access token on an
    unauthenticated endpoint. Highest-risk non-payment operation on the
    perimeter; rate-limit and abuse controls are not published.
governance_observations:
- >-
  The single highest-consequence tool (complete_checkout) is the one Hyperice
  explicitly fences with a human-approval rule — the provider's own guidance and
  this classification agree.
- >-
  The Storefront GraphQL API is served in public access mode, so every cart and
  customer mutation is reachable with no credential at all. That is the widest
  agentic exposure on this perimeter and it is entirely undocumented by Hyperice,
  whose /llms.txt describes only the read-only surface and the UCP tools.
- >-
  Scope granularity is the weakest control: the only buyer-scoped grants are
  customer-account-api:full and customer-account-mcp-api:full, so an agent that
  needs to read an order must be trusted to mutate the profile.
x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-07-31'
  note: >-
    Operation inventory is grounded in the live introspected schema, the UCP
    OpenRPC method list Hyperice's profile designates, and the derived REST
    OpenAPI. No operation listed here is invented; the access classification
    itself is our recommendation.