Air Canada Agentic Access

generated: '2026-07-28'
method: generated
source: >-
  https://ndc.aircanada.com/api/gettingstarted/apisetup (the published endpoint
  table), https://ndc.aircanada.com/api/gettingstarted/apisorchestration (the
  mandatory message order) and the per-service documentation pages. Air Canada
  publishes no OpenAPI, so 0-working/derive-agentic-access.py could not be run;
  the operations below are the ten NDC 17.2 message services Air Canada documents
  by name at endpoints it publishes, classified by hand against the same rules the
  script applies.
description: >-
  A recommended x-agentic-access execution contract for the Air Canada NDC API,
  following the Curity "Access Intelligence" model (apidays Munich 2026;
  vocabulary and Spectral ruleset in research/curity/agentic-governance/). This is
  a governance STARTING POINT authored by API Evangelist, not an Air Canada claim.
  Air Canada publishes no agent access guidance, no scope model and no
  human-in-the-loop policy - a single apikey header carries every call, which
  means the airline itself draws no distinction between an agent shopping for
  fares and an agent taking a payment. That is exactly the gap this file names.
  audience is left null to be bound per deployment.

disclaimer: >-
  Air Canada has not published any of this. Every consequence rating, TTL ceiling
  and escalation requirement below is API Evangelist's recommendation derived from
  what the message provably does, not a documented Air Canada control. The
  underlying platform offers no mechanism to enforce it - see
  authentication/air-canada-authentication.yml.

summary:
  operations: 10
  by_action_class:
    connected: 4
    acting: 6
  by_consequence:
    read: 4
    write: 2
    physical: 4
  human_in_the_loop: 0
  audit_required: 6
  transport: SOAP 1.1 over HTTPS POST, XML payload
  enforcement_available: false
  enforcement_note: >-
    Air Canada issues one apikey per seller with no scopes, no per-operation
    permissions and no token exchange. Nothing below can be enforced at the
    airline boundary; it must be enforced in the seller's own gateway in front of
    ndcpartners.aircanada.com.

operations:
  - operation: AirShopping
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/AirShopping
    message: AirShoppingRQ / AirShoppingRS
    action_class: connected
    consequence: read
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 3600
    audit: recommended
    note: >-
      Pure inventory search. The heaviest operation on the platform - Air Canada
      asks sellers at registration what percentage of their calls will be
      AirShopping and to compute their TPS from it, so an agent looping this is
      the most likely cause of a capacity conversation.

  - operation: OfferPrice
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/OfferPrice
    message: OfferPriceRQ / OfferPriceRS
    action_class: connected
    consequence: read
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 3600
    audit: recommended
    note: >-
      Read-only pricing of a selected offer, but mandatory before OrderCreate.
      An agent that skips it cannot book.

  - operation: ServiceList
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/ServiceList
    message: ServiceListRQ / ServiceListRS
    action_class: connected
    consequence: read
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 3600
    audit: recommended

  - operation: SeatAvailability
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/SeatAvailability
    message: SeatAvailabilityRQ / SeatAvailabilityRS
    action_class: connected
    consequence: read
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 3600
    audit: recommended

  - operation: OrderRetrieve
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/OrderRetrieve
    message: OrderRetrieveRQ / OrderViewRS
    action_class: acting
    consequence: read
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 3600
    audit: required
    purpose_required: true
    note: >-
      Classified acting rather than connected because the response returns
      passenger PII - name, birthdate, gender, identity document, postal address,
      email and phone - for a named traveller, keyed on an OrderID the caller must
      already hold. It is a read, but it is a read of someone else's personal
      data, so purpose should be recorded.

  - operation: OrderReshop
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/OrderReshop
    message: OrderReshopRQ / OrderReshopRS
    action_class: acting
    consequence: write
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 900
    audit: required
    note: >-
      Produces change offers against an existing Order. Does not itself move
      money, but it is step one of the two-step cancellation and its output
      determines the refund method the subsequent OrderCancel applies.

  - operation: OrderChange
    endpoint: aps-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/OrderChange
    message: OrderChangeRQ / OrderViewRS
    action_class: acting
    consequence: physical
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 300
      exchange: required
    purpose_required: true
    audit: required
    escalation:
      human_in_the_loop: recommended
    note: >-
      Routed through the PCI gateway (aps-gw) because it can carry form of
      payment. Modifies a live reservation - itinerary, seats, ancillaries,
      passenger detail - and can charge a card. Consequence physical because the
      change is to a real ticketed journey and settles money.

  - operation: OrderCreate
    endpoint: aps-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/OrderCreate
    message: OrderCreateRQ / OrderViewRS
    action_class: acting
    consequence: physical
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 300
      exchange: required
    purpose_required: true
    audit: required
    escalation:
      human_in_the_loop: recommended
    note: >-
      The money operation. Carries the full card payload to the PCI gateway,
      creates a real reservation, mints an OrderID and a record locator, and
      returns a ticket number. Irreversible without a separate cancellation flow
      that may not refund. This is the single operation an autonomous agent
      should not hold a standing credential for.

  - operation: OrderCancel
    endpoint: ipg-gw/ndc/17.2/v1/OrderCancel
    message: OrderCancelRQ / OrderCancelRS
    action_class: acting
    consequence: physical
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 300
      exchange: required
    purpose_required: true
    audit: required
    escalation:
      human_in_the_loop: recommended
    note: >-
      Destroys a live reservation. Air Canada documents a trap that makes this
      more dangerous for an agent than for a human: if no cancellation method was
      selected via OrderReshop first, OrderCancel "retains for future use" rather
      than refunding - the traveller loses the flight AND the money stays with the
      airline. Cancelled Orders also cannot be retrieved afterwards, so the agent
      cannot verify its own outcome.

  - operation: OrderChangeNotification
    endpoint: inbound to the seller (webhook), registered by email
    message: OrderChangeNotif
    direction: inbound-to-seller
    action_class: connected
    consequence: physical
    audience: null
    token:
      max_ttl_seconds: 3600
    audit: required
    note: >-
      Air Canada calls the seller, not the reverse. Consequence is physical
      because the payload announces an involuntary change to a real journey -
      schedule change, cancellation, disruption. No signature verification scheme
      is published, so a receiving agent cannot cryptographically establish that a
      disruption notice actually came from Air Canada. Treat every notification as
      unauthenticated and re-read state with OrderRetrieve before acting. See
      asyncapi/air-canada-ocn-webhooks.yml.

agent_guidance:
  - >-
    Split the credential. Air Canada issues one apikey with no scoping, so the
    only place a read/write boundary can exist is the seller's own gateway. Front
    ipg-gw shopping calls and aps-gw payment calls with different internal
    credentials.
  - >-
    Never let an agent retry OrderCreate blindly. There is no idempotency key and
    no de-duplication contract; a retried OrderCreateRQ is a second booking and a
    second charge. See conventions/air-canada-conventions.yml.
  - >-
    Always OrderReshop before OrderCancel. Skipping it converts a refund into a
    retained credit.
  - >-
    Persist every OrderID at creation time. There is no list or search operation
    and no bulk export, so an OrderID lost by the agent is a booking the seller
    can never enumerate again.
  - >-
    Capture orc-transaction-id on every call. It is the only trace identifier Air
    Canada support will accept on a ticket.

cross_links:
  authentication: authentication/air-canada-authentication.yml
  conventions: conventions/air-canada-conventions.yml
  errors: errors/air-canada-error-codes.yml
  webhooks: asyncapi/air-canada-ocn-webhooks.yml
  skills: skills/_index.yml